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The Sustainable Development
Principle in United States
Environmental Law
Michael P. Healy*
I.

Introduction

The American public perceives the principle of sustainable
development and sustainability, the shorthand nomenclature, through green-tinted lenses. Whether the user of the
term is academic,' corporate,2 or governmental,' the advocate
of sustainability is understood as an advocate of protecting
the environment. The international legal understanding of
the principle of sustainable development, however, is more
ambiguous than this popular American understanding.
Part II of this Article describes the important principle
of sustainable development in modern international environmental law.4 It discusses how the sustainable development
principle has evolved from its initial appearance in the 1987
*Wilburt D. Ham Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College
of Law. JD. 1984, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1978, Williams
College. The author thanks JenniferWills for reviewing an earlierdraft
of this article. The authoris responsiblefor any errors.
1.

2.

3.

4.

See, e.g., Green and Growing SustainabilityShowcase, UNIV.

OF KENTUCKY NEWS
(Sept. 15, 2009), http://uknow.uky.edu/category/tags/student-sustainability-

council; Planet Blue-The Sustainable Difference, http://sustainability.umich.
edu/education ("Beyond the classroom, [Michigan] offers myriad co-curricular
sustainability opportunities in the areas of campus life, career development,
and community service. As student interest in sustainability continues to grow,
we are working diligently to expand and enhance these every day learning opportunities for our students. [Michigan] students don't just study sustainability
they live it." (emphasis in original) (last visited Feb. 12, 2011)).
See, e.g., Environmental Policy, JP MORGAN CHASE, http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/Corporate-Responsibility/environmental-policy.htm
(last visited Feb. 12, 2011) (describing the company's "opportunity to make a
positive contribution to environmental and social concerns by enacting policies designed so that our business operations do not degrade the environment
or cause social harm. Such policies not only indicate positive environmental
stewardship, but also present business opportunities such as innovative financial products and investments in sustainable forestry and renewable energy.");
Press Release, IBM, IBM Global Survey Shows Information Gap in 'Green,'
Sustainability Strategies (June 1, 2009) (on file with author), available at
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/presskit/27512.wss.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 9, 2009) in which
"President Obama challenges all federal agencies to lead by example in energy
and environmental performance. The Order gives the agencies 90 days to set a
2020 greenhouse reduction goal and also sets targets for efficient and sustainable buildings, reduced petroleum use in vehicles, water efficiency, waste reduction, purchasing green technologies and products, and supporting sustain-

Brundtland Commission Report' through its central position at the Rio Earth Summit of 1992.6 These formulations
of the principle accepted that two contrasting goals-environmental protection and economic development-combined to define sustainable development. The Johannesburg
Summit of 2002 returned to the question of the meaning
of sustainable development and accepted a definition that
enriches the principle's paradoxical nature.7 This international understanding of sustainable development minimizes
its value as a principle of international law because so much
government policy may be defended by reference to it.
The principle may, however, provide a framework for assessing a particular nation's environmental law. Part III addresses
the extent to which U.S. environmental law adheres to the
principle of sustainable development.' The Article evaluates
three broad approaches taken by the principal federal environmental statutes. The first approach, the "thumb on the
scale" approach, includes the Clean Air Act ("CAA") and
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The second approach is the
balancing approach, which includes the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), and the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 ("ESA"). The third approach, which is
to shift the regulatory regime along the sustainable development spectrum, features the Toxic Substances Control Act
("TSCA"), the CAA regulation of hazardous air pollutants
mandated by the 1990 amendments, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA" or "Superfund"), and the Safe Drinking Water
Act ("SDWA"). An analysis of these statutes reveals a wide
range of approaches to balancing environmental protection
with economic growth. Although the wide variety of U.S.
environmental protection statutes makes them difficult to
evaluate with regard to sustainable development, Part IV
presents several conclusions. When deciding whether U.S.
environmental law conforms to the principle, one important
conclusion is that the CWA fails to offer sufficient protection

able communities." Government Ordered to Lead the Way on Sustainability,U.S.

5.

See infra note 12.

ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/Sustainability/index01272010.

6.
7.
8.

See infa note 16 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
See infa Part III.

htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
See infra Part II.
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of the environment. This summary also shows how sustainable development values may be accounted for in the type of
regulatory response that is employed. Favoring environmental protection is more likely to be politically acceptable if the
resulting regulatory requirements are less expensive. The sustainable development principle also assists in understanding
when less protection of the environment is more defensible.'

II.

The Sustainable Development Principle
in International Environmental Law

Professor Phillipe Sands has written that the principle of sustainable development in "[s]tate practice" has been "a feature
in international legal relations since at least 1893, when the
United States asserted a right to ensure the legitimate and
proper use of seals and to protect them, for the benefit of
mankind, from wanton destruction."o More recently, three
of the most prominent international discussions of sustainable development are the 1987 Brundtland Report, the Rio
Earth Summit in 1992, and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development.
The source of the term "sustainable development" itself
is in the 1987 Brundtland Report. By the time the United
Nation's Brundtland Commission issued its report, Our
Common Future:Report of the World Commission on Environment andDevelopment,the rationale for internationalconcern
regarding sustainable development had become grounded in
ecological interdependence:
[R]elated changes have locked the global economy and
global ecology together in new ways. We have in the past
been concerned about the impacts of economic growth upon
the environment. We are now forced to concern ourselves
with the impacts of ecological stress-degradation of soils,
water regimes, atmosphere, and forests upon our economic
prospects. We have in the more recent past been forced to
face up to a sharp increase in economic interdependence
among nations. We are now forced to accustom ourselves to
an accelerating ecological interdependence among nations.
Ecology and economy are becoming ever more interwoven

locally, regionally, nationally, and globally into a seamless
net of causes and effects.12
The Commission's Report identified the two key components of sustainable development: economic development
and environmental protection. The Report stated that, "[e]
nvironment and development are not separate challenges;
they are inexorably linked. Development cannot subsist upon
a deteriorating environmental resource base; the environment cannot be protected when growth leaves out the costs
of environmental destruction."" When specifically enumerating these concepts, however, the Report appeared to favor
development over protection by claiming "overriding priority" to "the essential needs of the world's poor" and by framing the protection of the environment in purely instrumental
terms, such as ensuring "the environment's ability to meet
present and future needs."14 The Report accordingly states
that a necessary component of sustainable development is the
eradication of human poverty.
The sustainable development principle became even more
prominent with the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Principle 1
of the 1992 Rio Declaration presents the paradoxical values
that animate sustainable development, stating that "[h]uman
12.

13.

14.

9. See infra Part IV.
10. PHILIPPE SANDS,

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw I:
FRAMEWORKs, STANDARDS AND IMPLEMENTATION 199 (1995). United States

statutory law has incorporated the principle of sustainable development since
at least 1916, when the National Park Service was established in the Department of the Interior. That Service was established "to promote and regulate
the use of the Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations." Act to Establish a National Park Service, Pub. L. No. 64-235, ch. 408,
39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)). That statute provided that "the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and
reservations . .. is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects
and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such
manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations." Id.
11. SANDS, supra note 10, at 198. But cf EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 44 (2d ed. 2007) ("The first publicly visible use of the term 'sustainable development' was most probably in 1980
when it appeared in the World Conservation Strategy (WCS), a document
prepared by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (IUCN).").
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15.

Rep. of the World Comm'n on Env't and Dev., Our Common Future, U.N.
Doc. A/42/427; GAOR, 42d Sess., at 21 (Aug. 4, 1987), available at http://
www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm [hereinafter BrundtlandReport].
Id. at 27 ("economics and ecology must be completely integrated in decision
making and lawmaking processes not just to protect the environment, but also
to protect and promote development. Economy is not just about the production of wealth, and ecology is not just about the protection of nature; they are
both equally relevant for improving the lot of humankind."); id. at 28 ("policy
makers guided by the concept of sustainable development will necessarily work
to assure that growing economies remain firmly attached to their ecological
roots and that these roots are protected and nurtured so that they may support
growth over the long term. Environmental protection is thus inherent in the
concept of sustainable development. . . .").
Id. at 54. The Brundtland Report stated that:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts:
*
the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the
world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and
*
the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and
social organization on the environment's ability to meet present
and future needs.
Id. Other language in the Report is arguably less instrumental in
describing the rationale for protection of environmental amenities.
See id. at 66-67 ("the case for the conservation of nature should
not rest only with development goals. It is part of our moral obligation to other living beings and future generations.").
See id. at 24-25 ("Poverty is not only an evil in itself, but sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to fulfil [sic] their aspirations for a better life. A world in which poverty is
endemic will always be prone to ecological and other catastrophes."); id. ch. 2,
29 ("development that is sustainable has to address the problem of the large
number of people who live in absolute poverty-that is, who are unable to
satisfy even the most basic of their needs.").
The Report's claims regarding sustainable development also include a
far more controversial view that there is a need for horizontal economic equity
among all nations. See id. at 55 ("Perceived needs are socially and culturally determined, and sustainable development requires the promotion of values that
encourage consumption standards that are within the bounds of the ecological possible and to which all can reasonably aspire."); id at 62 ("[Sustainable
development] requires a change in the content of growth, to make it less material-and energy-intensive and more equitable in its impact. These changes are
required in all countries as part of a package of measures to maintain the stock
of ecological capital, to improve the distribution of income, and to reduce the
degree of vulnerability to economic crises.").
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beings are at the center of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in
harmony with nature."16
Although much discussion of sustainable development
highlights how the principle forms the basis for a new environmentalist era,17 greater caution needs to be exercised with
respect to this principle. Indeed, one need look no further
than Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration to recognize that the
principle of sustainable development may take on various
meanings. Principle 2 states that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."8
Principle 2 thus insists upon a nation's sovereign right to
exploit its resources, with the "no significant harm principle" placing the only limitation on state autonomy regarding
environmental protection and the use of national resources." That limitation imposes far fewer constraints on the use
and development of resources than would a requirement that
resource development ensure the continued availability of
those resources for the nation's future use.
If Principle 2 stresses the development side of the sustainable development continuum, Principles 3 and 4 highlight
the importance of sustainability itself. Principle 3 identifies the importance of intergenerational equity: "The right
to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet
environmental and developmental needs of present and
future generations." 2 0 Principle 4 then defines the means for
reaching the end of intergenerational equity recognized by
Principle 3: "In order to achieve sustainable development,
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of
the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it."2 1
The Rio Summit principles, in short, reflect the inherent
tension in the principle of sustainable development: economic impact must be balanced against environmental degradation when a nation utilizes its natural resources. The Rio
Declaration also identified other principles, one of which has
come to exacerbate the tensions between environmental deg16.

17.

18.
19.

20.
21.

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declarationon Environmentand Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONE151/26/Rev.1 (vol. 1), princ. 1 (Aug. 12, 1992)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. It is understandable that the
United States, as a wealthy industrialized nation, would be more focused on
the environmental protection component of sustainable development, because
poverty eradication is not nearly as pressing a problem as it is for developing
countries.
Rio Declaration,supra note 16, princ. 2.
The "no significant harm principle" is most famously articulated in Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration. See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONE48/41/Rev.1, princ. 21, reprinted in 11 J.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
Rio Declaration,supra note 16, princ. 3.
Id. princ. 4.

21

radation and economic development. Principle 7 of the Rio
Declaration states that:
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to
conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the
Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions
to global environmental degradation, States have common
but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the
pressures their societies place on the global environment and
of the technologies and financial resources they command.22
Professor Sands views Principle 7 as an initial articulation
of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.23 Common but differentiated responsibility bears significantly on the sustainable development principle because it
provides that sustainable development will impose different
obligations on different nation states with regard to their use
of environmental amenities.
Principle 7 articulates the two important bases for differentiating the environmental protection obligations of nations
in their use of resources. Most prominently, Principle 7 states
that developed nations are obligated to work harder to protect the environment because their economies have contributed the most to its degradation. 2 4 Principle 7 also states that
developed nations have a greater responsibility to protect the
environment because they have the technical and financial
ability to work against environmental degradation. 25 In sum,
Principle 7 expressly recognizes the contextual nature of the
sustainable development principle: sustainable development
does not impose an absolute limit on permissible environmental degradation for economic development. 2 6 Rather, less
developed nations may, consistent with the principle, degrade
the environment more severely as they seek to improve their
economic conditions. 2 7 Indeed, the Rio principles appear to
recognize only one fundamental limit on the environmental
degradation that may accompany economic development:
the "no significant harm" requirement of Principle 2.28
The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development,
held in Johannesburg, South Africa, highlighted these tensions within the principle of sustainable development. 29 The
Declaration and the Plan of Implementation, both adopted at
the Johannesburg Summit, highlighted the conflicting goals
that lie at the heart of sustainable development by focusing
22. Id. princ. 7.
23. SANDS, supra note 10, at 217.
24. Rio Declaration, supra note 16, princ. 7. This basis for greater responsibility
relates to the polluter pays principle of international environmental law. See
generally SANDS, supranote 10, at 213-17.
25. Rio Declaration,supra note 16, princ. 7.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See supranote 18 and accompanying text.
29. See generally World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S.
Afr., Aug. 26-Sept.4, 2002, The JohannesburgDeclaration on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONE199/20, Annex I (Sept. 23, 2002) [hereinafter
The JohannesburgDeclaration];World Summit on Sustainable Development,
Johannesburg, S. Afr., Aug. 26-Sept.4, 2002, Plan of Implementation of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONE199/20, Annex II (Sept. 23, 2002) [hereinafter JohannesburgPlan ofImplementation].
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greater attention on the concerns of less-developed nations
and by re-establishing the eradication of poverty as one of
sustainable development's core components.3 0 Although the
Johannesburg Summit participants restated their commitment to the principles of the Rio Declaration,31 the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation explicitly recognized the
significance of Rio Declaration Principle 7 to the concept of
sustainable development and thereby compounded the paradoxical and contextual nature of the sustainable development
principle:
[W]e commit ourselves to undertaking concrete actions
and measures at all levels and to enhancing international
cooperation, taking into account the Rio principles, including, inter alia, the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities as set out in principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. These efforts will
also promote the three components of sustainable development-economic development, social development and
environmental protection-as interdependent and mutually
reinforcing pillars. Poverty eradication, changing unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and protecting
and managing the natural resource base of economic and
social development are overarching objectives of, and essential requirements for, sustainable development.32
The effect of the Johannesburg Summit deliberations on
the principle of sustainable development thus appears to
be two-fold. First, the participants enriched the contextual
nature of sustainability by adding "social development" to
what had previously been the bipolar components of economic development and environmental protection.33 Though
more contextual in this respect, sustainable development
was also made more determinative in one respect: development can only be defined as sustainable if it has the effect of
eradicating poverty. The Johannesburg Summit accordingly
imposed a limit on sustainability that mirrors the absolute
limit identified in the Rio Declaration principles: development is sustainable except in cases where poverty has not
been eradicated or where the development of resources violates the no significant harm principle.3 4
In sum, the contemporary international understanding of
sustainable development accepts as permissible an exceptionally wide range of development along with its adverse impacts
on the environment. Following the Johannesburg Summit,
the acceptable range across all nations has been broadened
by the new willingness to account for each nation's stage of
development.

30. The seventh paragraph of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation states that
"Eradicating poverty is the greatest global challenge facing the world today and
an indispensable requirementfor sustainable development, particularly for developing countries." The JohannesburgDeclaration,supra note 29, 7 (emphasis
added).
31. Id. 8.
32. JohannesburgPlan ofImplementation, supra note 29, 2 (footnote omitted).
33. The JohannesburgDeclaration, supra note 29, 5; JohannesburgPlan oflmplementation, supra note 29, 2.
34. TheJohannesburgDeclaration,supra note 29, 11; JohannesburgPlan oflmplementation, supra note 29, 7.

Summer 20| |

This broad range of permissible development across many
nations should not, however, obscure how the principle of
sustainable development, allied with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, ought to apply to a
rich, industrialized nation like the United States. To be sure,
such a nation would not violate international law unless its
failure to protect the environment caused significant harm
beyond its own borders.
The principle of sustainable development for a rich nation,
though, should provide that, if the environment can be
protected sufficiently at a reasonable cost, the environment
must be protected sufficiently. This understanding emerges
because the United States is wealthy enough that neither poverty eradication nor the state of development is an acceptable
rationale for a failure to provide sufficient protection for the
environment. This understanding is also in accord with the
popular understanding of sustainability in the United States,
which emphasizes protection of the environment.
With this general background in the international principle of sustainable development, we turn to an assessment of
environmental protection law in the United States to gauge
the extent to which it incorporates the principle.

Ill. The Sustainable Development Principle
in United States Environmental Law
One might expect that an assessment of the extent to which
U.S. environmental law reflects the sustainable development principle would begin by describing how that law
expressly relies upon the principle. The words "sustainable
development" are, however, missing entirely from federal
environmental statutes." The assessment of the compatibility of federal environmental protection law with sustainable
development will therefore depend on an understanding of
the architecture of the statutes intended to protect the environment. A review of federal environmental law leads to a
conclusion that these laws reflect widely varied approaches
to sustainability.
The approaches fall into several categories described in
detail below: the thumb on the scale approach, the balancing approach, and the shifting approach. This basic approach
to organizing an understanding of U.S. environmental law
focuses on the degree to which statutes reference environmental protection alone (often determined by adverse public health impacts), economic impact alone, or a balance of
environmental protection and economic impact. This is an
important, but not a sufficient ground for understanding

35. A Westlaw search yielded 35 instances where the words appear in the Annotated United States Code. More than two-thirds of these occur in the context
of foreign relations and foreign trade, including agricultural trade and technology transfers in the energy sector. Four of the remaining eight occurrences
involve domestic commerce, including military purchasing policy. Three of the
remaining occurrences relate to international conservation measures included
in Title 16. The last of the occurrences is in a note to, but not in the text of,
the purpose provision of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 4321 (West 2010). That note includes a reference to the President's Council
on Sustainable Development, established by Exec. Order No. 12,852, 58 Fed
Reg. 35,841 (June 29, 1993).
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how environmental law reflects the principle of sustainable
development.
It will also be important to understand the nature of the
regulatory regime that is triggered by the consideration of
adverse environmental impacts, economic impacts, or a balancing of the two. The best known regulatory approach is
command and control regulation, which involves the imposition of controls on activities, usually polluting activities,
that either degrade or increase the risk of degrading the environment.3 6 Another regulatory approach, information-based
regulation, relies on the development and consideration of
information related to the adverse environmental effect that
is of concern. 7 This second approach is the approach that
imposes the fewest costs on the regulated party." A third
regulatory approach is the imposition of liability for causing environmental degradation.39 Because these regulatory
approaches impose different costs, the impact of regulation
on sustainability may depend on the type of regulation as
well as on the circumstances under which regulatory action
is permitted or required.

A.

The Thumb on the Scale Approach: Favoring
Environmental Protection or Economic
Development in Regulating Impacts on the
Environment

The first approach to sustainable development is one in which
the legal structure establishes a preference either for environmental protection or economic development. The two principal federal environmental statutes, the CAA and the CWA,
lie at either end of this spectrum.

36.

See CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 6

(3d ed. 2010) ("Command-and-Control regulations are regulations that direct
people to do certain specific things or prohibit them from doing certain specific things."). The authors describe how these regulatory requirements may be
determined by impacts on health or the environment, by available technology
or by a comparison of the costs and benefits of regulation. See id. at 6-7.
37. Information-based regulation may take one of two forms. One form is environmental planning, which requires government actors to consider and share
information about environmental impacts before taking action. See CELIA
CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM RESOURCES To RECOV-

ERY 138-39 (1993). The second form involves the dissemination of information to the public or to consumers regarding environmental impacts and risks.
See id at 142-43.
38. The costs are low because this approach does not impose any direct controls
on activities that harm or pollute the environment. The approach requires only
that the impacts be understood or communicated to the public. Notwithstanding the low cost, the approach "is a subtle but powerful tool to achieve environmental objectives." Id. at 142. See generally Bradley C. Karkainnen, Information
as EnvironmentalRegulation: TRI and PerformanceBenchmarking Precursorto a
New Paradigm?,89 Geo. L.J. 257 (2001).
39. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JRi,ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 58-59 (2d ed. 1994).
The use of market-based mechanisms to protect the environment is addressed
infra notes 48 & 80.

I.

23

Environmental Protection as the Organizing
Regulatory Principle:The Clean Air Act's
Attainment Principle

The core of the CAM 0 is the requirement, often breached to
be sure," that all geographic areas comply with the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS").4 2 The NAAQS
are defined based only upon a consideration of scientific studies of the adverse effects that the criteria pollutants have on
public health (for the primary NAAQS) 4 4 and public welfare
(for the secondary NAAQS). 4 1 The Supreme Court recently
reached the conclusion, long ago reached by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,4 6 that Congress permitted the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA') to consider only the human health or environmental effects of criteria pollutants, and not the economic feasibility of those standards, when it establishes or revises the
NAAQS. 47
The CAA initially provided states with substantial discretion to define the limitations on emissions of criteria pollutants in order to comply with the NAAQS. The 1977 CAA
40. 42U.S.C. §§ 7401-7 6 7lq (2 0 0 6 ).
41. The areas of the country that have not attained one or more of EPAs standards
for air quality are available online. Currently DesignatedNonattainmentAreas
for All Criteria Pollutants, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oar/
oaqps/greenbk/ancl3.html (last updated Dec. 17, 2010). Data from an EPA
study covering the years 1983-2002 indicates that as of September 2002, more
than 125 million people were living in areas where the ambient concentration
of at least one criteria pollutant exceeded the acceptable level defined by EPA.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT app. at 169 (2003), available athttp://www.epa.gov/airtrends/non-table.
pdf. A recent EPA study sets that figure at 127 million as of 2008. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, OUR NATIONS AIR: STATUS AND TRENDS THROUGH 2008
(2010), available athttp://www.epa.gov/airtrends/2010/report/fullreport.pdf
42. Section 109(a) of the CAA requires EPA to promulgate NAAQS for criteria
pollutants listed by EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (2006). Section 110(a)(1) requires states to adopt State Implementation Plans ("SIP") to "provide[] for
implementation, maintenance and enforcement of" the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C.
4
§ 7 10(a)(1). The Act then provides for the imposition of sanctions on a state
that fails to submit a SIP ensuring attainment of the NAAQS by the attainment date or that fails to implement a SIP approved by EPA. 42 U.S.C. §§
7410(m), 7509(a)-(b).
43. A criteria pollutant is an "air pollutant [ emissions of which, in [the EPA
Administrator's] judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare [and] the presence
ofwhich in the ambient air results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources ..... 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B). That provision also provides
that the air pollutant be one "for which air quality criteria had not been issued
before December 31, 1970, but for which [the Administrator] plans to issue air
quality criteria under this section." 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(C). As construed in
NRDC v. Train, 545 E2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976), the third requirement does not
accord discretion to EPA to defer designation of a pollutant meeting the first
two requirements.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
45. Id. § 7409(b)(2).
46. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 E2d 1130, 1148-50 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
47. SeeWhitman v. American TruckingAss'n, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001). Whether
the ambient standards defined by EPA are stringent enough to protect human

health and the environment is an issue that is beyond the scope of this article.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (providing that each SIP is to "include enforceable emission limitations and other control measures, means, or techniques ...
as may be necessary or appropriate to meet the applicable requirements of
this chapter"). One of the "other control measures, means, or techniques" that
states may employ is the use of tradable emissions credits. See 40 C.ER. §§
51.490-51.494 (defining rules for voluntary trading programs). Such credits
may be traded or sold among controlled sources. The trading systems are designed to yield the same aggregate emissions affecting air quality at a lower total
cost of control because sources with lower costs of control will generally reduce
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Amendments, however, limited state discretion by imposing
minimum requirements for emissions. 9 As amended, the
CAA imposes the most stringent federally mandated emissions limitation for major new sources of criteria pollutants
located in areas that have not attained the NAAQS for those
pollutants.5 0 The 1977 Amendments also mandated minimum limits on emissions of criteria pollutants from existing stationary sources in areas that have not attained the
NAAQS for those pollutants." In short, the CAA mandates
minimum limits on emissions of pollutants in nonattainment areas from new and existing sources in order to ensure
the attainment of the health-based or environmental-qualitybased NAAQS. 5 2
To be sure, the CAA imposes mandatory limits on emissions from air pollution sources, even when the affected air
quality complies with the NAAQS. These limitations are
intended, however, to ensure adequate protection of human
health and the environment. Thus, section 111 mandates
emissions limits for stationary sources of air pollution, categorically and without regard to ambient air quality, based
on the administrative determination that the "category of
sources .

.

. causes, or contributes significantly to, air pollu-

tion which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare."53 Similarly, EPA must define emissions
limitations for new mobile sources when "the emission of any
air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles
or new motor vehicle engines, which in [the Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare."5 Finally, the amended Act also established minimum emissions limitations for major emitting facilities to
ensure that air quality in areas that meet the NAAQS will not
be significantly degraded. 5 This anti-degradation program
was intended, in part, to provide an added margin of safety
for human health because of the non-threshold impacts of
the criteria pollutants. 6
In broad terms, therefore, Congress established a requirement in the structure of the CAA that minimum standards
of environmental quality had to be met, regardless of the
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economic consequences and costs of the pollution controls. 7
The CAA, in short, adopts a model of environmental protection that seeks to ensure a defined level of environmental
quality without regard to the economic impacts that result
from requiring compliance with that standard. This model
plainly favors the environmental quality side of sustainable
development.

2.

Defining the Extent of Environmental
Protection Based on Economic Concerns:The
CWA's Pollution Control Regime

Congress established the structure of the modern CWA in
1972.19 Although enacted only two years after the CAA and
before the time that NAAQS compliance was first mandated
by the CAA, the CWA reflects greater ambivalence toward
the protection of human health and environmental quality.60 The CWA does not define the required degree of environmental protection by reference to an adequately healthy
environment,6 ' but rather based on the control of pointsource emissions of pollutants as determined by available
pollution control technologies. 62
The CWA protects the nation's surface waters by prohibiting the discharge of any pollutant from a point source except
in compliance with a permit. 63 The most important such
permit, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit,64 applies to discharges from point
sources, including industrial point sources.65 Available technology is the basis for the limits on the pollutant discharges
allowed by the permit. 66 The two most important technology-based standards, best practicable technology ("BPT"), 67
57. See generally Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 426 (1976).
58. The CAAs regulatory approach to hazardous air pollutants differs from its
regulation of criteria pollutants. CAA regulation of hazardous air pollutants is
discussed infra Part C.2.
59. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 (2006)).
60. The CWAs regulatory approach is described in greater detail in Michael E

Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-five Years: Water Quality Standard Enforcement
and the Availability ofCitizen Suits, 24 EcoLOGY L.Q. 393, 396-414 (1996).
61.

emissions (to generate credits), rather than sources with higher control costs,
which will purchase credits. See generally Economic Incentive Program Rules,
59 Fed. Reg. 16,690, 16,690 (Apr. 17, 1994) (emissions trading programs are
intended to "assist States in meeting air quality management goals through
flexible approaches which benefit both the environment and the regulated entities, allow for less costly control strategies, and provide stronger incentives for
the development and implementation of pollution prevention measures and
innovative emissions reductions technology.").
49. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 746-751 (1977) (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (2006)).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503.
51. See id. § 7502(c).
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.

See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (describing the CAA NAAQS
and the attainment principle).
62. A page of history may explain the decision not to employ a regulatory approach focused on protection of water quality. Such an approach, dependent
on state adopted and enforced water quality standards had been the regulatory
approach of the quite unsuccessful Water Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 89234, 79 Stat. 903. See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd.,
426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976).
63. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).
64. Id. § 1342. The other permit system governs the "discharge of dredged or fill
44
material into the navigable waters . . . ." Id. § 13 (a). The relationship between these two permit systems is the subject of the Supreme Court decision

in CoeurAlaska, Inc. v. SoutheastAlaska ConservationCouncil, 129 S. Ct. 2458

See id. § 7502 (State Implementation "Plan Requirements" for areas that
are nonattainment). The 1990 Amendments imposed even more stringent
minimum requirements. See RODGERS, supra note 39, at 223-27 (describing minimum requirements for nonattainment areas prescribed by the 1990
Amendments).
Id. §7411(b)(1)(A).
Id. §7521(a)(1).
See id. §§ 7470-7492.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 107 (1977). The anti-degradation provisions
also were motivated by economic development concerns, because this program
would even the playing field for sources of air pollution. See id. at 137.

(2009).
65. See id. § 1362(14) (broadly defining "point source").
66. See id § 1311(b); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE
ELIMINATION SYSTEM (NPDES) PERMIT WRITERS' MANUAL (2010) 5-1,
available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/writermanual.cfm?program id=45.
("Technology-based effluent limitations (TBELs) aim to prevent pollution by
requiring a minimum level of effluent quality that is attainable using demonstrated technologies for reducing discharges of pollutants or pollution into the
waters of the United States . . . .").
67. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A). EPAs approach to defining BPT limits is the
following:
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and best available technology ("BAT"), 68 define effluent limitations based either on the technologies that are already in
use within a particular industrial category, or on the availability of a technology that may be transferred to that category of point sources.69 These standards for existing sources
differ in their level of stringency. The more stringent standard, BAT, applies to toxic and nonconventional pollutants,
which are more injurious to health and the environment, 70
while BPT is less stringent and applies to conventional pollutants.71 Both limits are, however, defined by reference to
available technologies. 72 Standards for new sources also look
to available technologies.73 As pollution control technologies
improve over time, EPA must establish more stringent standards for each category of sources.74
Whether a technology is available and therefore may provide the basis for effluent limitations for a category of sources

68.

69.
70.
71.

72.
73.

depends on the particular effluent limit of concern.75 In general, a technology's availability depends on the costs and benefits of pollution control.76 Thus, a control standard may be
rejected as a proper basis for identifying effluent limits if the
costs of control are found to outweigh the benefits of control sufficiently. This may occur even though the standard is
technically available to an industrial category.77 Because the
consideration of the availability of a technology is pursued by
reference to a category of sources,78 the economic impact of
mandating compliance with an effluent limitation for a particular source is not a consideration.79 The impact on a particular source of utilizing the control technology needed to
gain compliance with the applicable effluent limitation may
cause a source to go out of business. 0 Indeed, Congress had
anticipated this adverse economic impact when it enacted the
statute.
Notwithstanding this consideration of various factors,
including the costs and benefits of control, EPA's general

Traditionally, the EPA establishes BPT effluent limitations based on
the average of the best performances of facilities within the industry, grouped to reflect various ages, sizes, processes or other common
characteristics . . . . If, however, existing performance is uniformly
inadequate, the EPA may establish BPT limitations based on higher
levels of control than currently in place in an industrial category when
based on an Agency determination that the technology is available in
another category or subcategory, and can be practically applied.
Effluent Limitation Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for
the Airport Deicing Category, 74 Fed. Reg. 44,676, 44,678-79 (Aug. 28,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 449).
See 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(2)(A) (2006). EPAs approach to defining BAT limits
is the following:
In general, BAT effluent limitation guidelines represent the best economically achievable performance of facilities in the industrial subcategory or category ....
As with BPT, where existing performance is
uniformly inadequate, BAT may reflect a higher level of performance
than is currently being achieved based on technology transferred from
a different subcategory or category. BAT also may be based upon process changes or internal controls, even when these technologies are not
common industry practice.
Effluent Limitation Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for
the Airport Deicing Category, 74 Fed. Reg. at 44679.
See supranotes 66-68.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (2006).
See id. § 1311(b)(1)(A). The CWA also includes a more stringent level of control for conventional pollutants called the "best conventional pollutant control
technology [BCT]." Id. § 1311(b)(2)(E). BCT is a control requirement that
is more stringent than the baseline BPT standard. EPAs web site states that
"BCT is established in light of a two-part 'cost reasonableness' test which compares the cost for an industry to reduce its pollutant discharge with the cost to
a POTW [publicly owned treatment works] for similar levels of reduction of a
pollutant loading. The second test examines the cost-effectiveness of additional
industrial treatment beyond BPT. EPA must find limits which are reasonable
under both tests before establishing them as BCT." ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
NPDES Glossary, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/glossary.cfm?program-id=0#B
(last updated Mar. 23, 2004).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b); supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
EPAs approach to standards for new sources is the following:
NSPS [New Source Performance Standards] reflect effluent reductions
that are achievable based on the best available demonstrated control
technology. New facilities have the opportunity to install the best and
most efficient production processes and wastewater treatment technologies. As a result, NSPS should represent the greatest degree of effluent reduction attainable through the application of the best available
demonstrated control technology for all pollutants (i.e., conventional,
nonconventional, and priority pollutants).
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-821-B-01-007, DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENT FOR

75. The Supreme Court in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. provided an Appendix
that identifies five standards for control of point source emissions under the
CWA. 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1511 (2009). The Court's chart provides the statutory
text that defines the basis for establishing each such standard.
76. See id. at 1506-10.
77. The degree to which costs are compared to benefits depends on the applicable
standard of control. See generally id. In Chemical Manufacturers.Assn v. EPA,
the court held that, in defining the baseline BPT limitations, the "relevant
inquiry ... is whether the costs are 'wholly disproportionate' to the benefits."
870 F.2d 177, 205 (5th Cir. 1989). The court upheld the limitations defined
by EPA which had been based on EPA estimating that:
[T]he BPT limitations would result annually in the removal of 108
million pounds of conventional pollutants from [ ] discharges and
consequently from our nation's waters at an annualized compliance
cost of 76.6 million dollars after a capital investment of 215.8 million
dollars. Thus, the EPA concluded that the total cost of BPT is warranted by the total pounds of pollutant removed.
Id. at 204 (footnotes omitted). Even less consideration to the costs and benefits of
regulation is given when EPA defines BAT standards. See Rybachek v. EPA,
904 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1990).
78. See generally E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
79. For this reason, a source is not permitted to obtain avariance from a categorical
standard, based on the inability of the particular source to afford the costs of
the pollution controls needed to comply with the applicable effluent limitations. The Supreme Court in EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn concluded
that:
[I]f pollution is to be diminished, limitations based on [the best
practicable technology, the baseline level of control] must forbid the
level of effluent produced by the most pollution-prone segment of
the industry, that segment not measuring up to "the average of the
best existing performance." So understood, the statute contemplated
regulations that would require a substantial number of point sources
with the poorest performances either to conform to BPT standards or
to cease production. To allow a variance based on economic capability
and not to require adherence to the prescribed minimum technology
would permit the employment of the very practices that the Administrator had rejected in establishing the best practicable technology
currently in use in the industry.
449 U.S. at 64, 76 (1980).
80. See id. at 74-77. Moreover, costs of control may vary greatly among different
industries. The fact that control technologies are available to different industries (and thereby influence their effluent limitations) does not mean that the
different industries will have the same costs of control. When costs of control
differ, the total costs of controlling the same aggregate amount of pollution
may be reduced by the use of a credit trading regime. See supra note 48 (describing the trading of pollution credits under the CAA). The CWA may also

THE PROPOSED EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR THE
MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS INDUSTRY POINT SOURCE CATEGORY (40 CFR

authorize trading credits in certain circumstances. See OFFICE OF WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY 2 (2003), available at

432), at 2-3 to -4 (2002).

74.

25

http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/finalpolicy2003.pdf

See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(m) (2006) (requiring a "schedule for the annual review
and revision of promulgated effluent guidelines").

81.

See EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. at 80-82 (discussing legislative
history).
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approach to effluent limitations is to look toward the emissions controls achieved by sources in the particular industrial category. 82 For BPT standards, limits are generally based
on the average of the best results achieved by sources in the
category.8 3 For BAT standards, EPA defines limits based on
the best results for each pollutant achieved by sources in
the category. 4 This practical approach to defining effluent
limitations reinforces the extent to which CWA regulation is
determined by available technologies.
Imposing these pollution controls on point sources
should, of course, improve the environmental quality of protected waters, as compared with the quality that would result
from unregulated emissions of pollutants by point sources.
Any federally mandated" improvement in the environmental quality of the nation's surface waters is driven, however,
by the imposition of the available technology-based limits,
rather than by mandating the minimum acceptable quality
of the waters receiving the discharges. 6 Indeed, the CWA
does not impose enforceable limits on pollution contributed
by nonpoint sources. 7 These sources are subject only to planning requirements and may be subject to management practice requirements.
To be sure, the CWA does not ignore the condition of
the receiving waters. Federal regulation of water pollution
prior to 1972 had unsuccessfully sought to control pollution by ensuring adequate water quality." The current Act
partly retains this regulatory approach by requiring states to
establish water quality standards and to review and revise
the water quality standards every three years,90 and then by
relating discharge permit requirements to those water quality
standards.91 Indeed, a core requirement of the current CWA,
unfortunately honored often in the breach, 92 is that the
effluent limits on discharges of pollutants included in point
source NPDES permits must be stringent enough to attain
the state's water quality standards.93
Given this regulatory structure, one might claim that the
CWA pollution control requirements are analogous to CAA
requirements9 4 because the stringency of the CWA's required
pollution controls is determined by whether the permitted
discharge will cause a violation of permissible ambient pollut82.
83.
84.
85.

86.
87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 67.
See supra note 68.
The CWA permits states to impose more stringent permit requirements than
those mandated by the federal technology-based approach. See 33 U.S.C. §
1370 (2006).
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
"Nonpoint source pollution is caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over and
through the ground and carrying natural and human-made pollutants into
lakes, rivers, streams, wetlands, estuaries, other coastal waters, and ground water. Atmospheric deposition and hydrologic modification are also sources of
nonpoint pollution." Nonpoint Source Program and Grants Guidelines for
States and Territories, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,653, 60,655 (Oct. 23, 2003).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2006).
See Healy, supra note 60, at 397-98.
See 40 C.F.R. § 131.20.
33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)
See Healy, supra note 60, at 414-415 (discussing studies describing violations
of state water quality standards).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(1)-(a)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring state implementation plans for national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards).
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ant levels in the waters receiving the discharged pollutants.95
The statutes, however, differ greatly in how the relevant
ambient standards, NAAQS for the CAA and water quality
standards for the CWA, are determined. EPA only considers
the human health impacts of exposure to the criteria pollutant when it establishes the national primary NAAQS for
criteria pollutants.9 6 The CAA then requires that all areas of
the country attain those standards or be subject to more rigorous regulatory requirements9 7 and sanctions for the failure
to attain the NAAQS by the attainment date.9'
The CWA does not require that all of the nation's surface
waters have quality sufficient to permit healthful fishing and
swimming.99 Water quality standards are defined by each
state, which then submits its standards to EPA for review and
approval. 00 Although states have some discretion in establishing water quality standards, the CWA does impose some
important requirements. Except for the absolute minimum
requirement that "[i]n no case shall a State adopt waste transport or waste assimilation as a designated use for any waters
of the United States,"o1 the limitations on state discretion
relate back to the impact of the federal categorical technology-based effluent limitations on ambient water quality.102
EPA regulations require states to define water quality standards that are stringent enough to protect existing in-stream
uses of the waterway.1 03 Absent a state's decision to impose
permit requirements more stringent than the federal standards for categories of industrial point sources, the current
existing use would reflect the water quality that the technology-based effluent limitations mandated by the CWA would
achieve.10 4 Despite the permissibility of the uses of surface
waters that are far less protective than fishable and swimmable waters, the nation's waters commonly fail to comply
with the less protective water quality standards defined by
the states. 05
An exception to the acceptance ofwater quality that results
from implementation of technology-based limits involves
"high quality waters."1 0 6 EPA regulations accord more specific protection to waters that "constitute an outstanding
National resource, such as waters of National and State parks
See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)-(e).
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 42.
See infra notes 105, 114 and accompanying text.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
EPAWater Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. §131.10(a) (2009).
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (2006).
See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1) (2009); see also id. § 131.10(h)(2)(i) ("Where
existing water quality standards specify designated uses less than those which
are presently being attained, the State shall revise its standards to reflect the
uses actually being attained.").
104. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006) (permitting states to impose effluent limitations
that are more stringent than the federal limits).
105. EPAs 2004 Report to Congress on the quality of the nation's surface waters
stated that "[o]f these assessed [rivers and streams], 44% were reported as impaired, or not clean enough to support at least one of their designated uses"
and that 64% of the assessed "lakes, ponds, and reservoirs" were impaired
with regard to the designated uses. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER
QuALTY INVENTORY: REPORT TO CONGRESS (2004 Reporting Cycle), at ES-2
(2009), availableat http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/305b/upload/
4
2009_05 20_305b_200 report-report2004ptl.pdf.
106. See 40 C.ER. § 131.12(a)(3) (2009).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
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and wildlife refuges and waters of exceptional recreational or
ecological significance." 107 For these high quality waters, the
regulations require that "water quality shall be maintained
and protected." 08 This mandate, however, amounts to nothing more than a specific direction to maintain the existing
water quality for waters whose quality has managed to be
outstanding under the CWA's regulatory regime.
Redesignation of waterway use also reflects the fact that
water quality standards are not designed to compel independently an improvement in water quality throughout the
country. A state has the discretion to raise a waterway's water
quality standards above the standards needed to protect the
existing in-stream uses.10 9 In this way, a state may attempt
to cause an improvement in a waterway's quality and facilitate new, more protective uses for the waterway. A state that
takes this approach may later redesignate the waterway's uses
to ones that are less protective, provided that the redesignated use is no less protective than the current use; 1 o that
the more protective designated use cannot be achieved as a
consequence of the required federal pollutant limitations;11
and that the imposition of effluent limits more stringent than
the federal limits "would result in substantial and widespread
economic and social impact." 112 This redesignation process
demonstrates that the water quality that results from the
implementation of the national technology-based effluent
limitations is really the fundamental determinant of required
water quality. Except for high quality waters,113 the CWA
does not require the achievement of any more protective use.
The fact that optimal water quality is merely aspirational
under the CWA, as opposed to the mandatory nature of the
CAAs NAAQS, also demonstrates how improved water quality fundamentally relies upon technology-based limitations:

27

Thus, the two most important federal statutes protecting
the environment, the CAA and the CWA, approach sustainability from very different places. The CAAs regulation of
criteria pollutants strongly values the attainment of healthful
environmental quality. The CWA, on the other hand, mandates protection of the environment only to the extent that
the protection is affordable.

B.

The Balancing Approach:Addressing
Sustainable Development Concerns on a Caseby-Case Basis

Other U.S. environmental protection statutes diverge from
the contrasting approaches of the CAA and CWA to sustainable development. This second group of environmental statutes appears to more closely reflect the competing objectives
of economic development and environmental sustainability
that underlie the principle of sustainable development. Each
of these three regulatory regimes requires a balancing of the
benefits and costs of taking action to protect the environment. The regimes differ, however, in defining the regulatory
impact of that balancing. One approach gives the governmental actor the authority to decide which actions, if any, it
wishes to take in order to protect the environment, presumably based on a weighing of costs and benefits of regulation.
Another approach forecloses protective regulatory action
when the environment and health benefits do not exceed the
costs that regulation imposes on the economy. Finally, the
third regulatory regime forecloses regulatory action when
there is a firm conclusion that regulation would harm economic development more than the environmental degradation that is expected to occur without regulation.

[W]ater quality standards should, wherever attainable,pro-

vide water quality for the protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish and wildlife and for recreation in and on the water
and take into consideration their use and value of public
water supplies, propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife,
recreation in and on the water, and agricultural, industrial,
and other purposes including navigation.114
In sum, the CWA employs a regulatory approach that
is expected to yield incremental improvements in environmental quality. In the absence of a state's decision to
pursue environmental protection at any cost-that is, promoting environmental protection without regard to costthe environmental improvements won by the CWA result
from the application of pollution controls that are generally
affordable."
107. Id
108. Id.
109. See id. § 131.4(a).

110. Id. § 131.10(h)(1).
111. See id. § 131.10(h)(2).
112. Id. § 131.10(g)( 6 ).
113. See supranotes 106-108 and accompanying text.
114. 40 C.ER. § 131.2 (emphasis added).
115. These federally mandated controls, despite being established by reference to
available technologies, were expected to cause significant economic hardship
for particular sources. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. More-

I.

A Mandate that the Agency Consider Expected
Adverse Environmental Impacts Before
Pursuing Development Activities

The Brundtland Commission Report's strong advocacy
of the sustainable development principle highlighted the
importance of governmental consideration of environmental impacts prior to taking governmental action." This suggested process of governmental decisionmaking is the process
required by NEPA.'17 Enacted at the outset of the environmental decade of the 1970s, NEPA takes an informationbased regulatory approach. NEPA does not expressly require
an agency to balance the benefits of a proposed action against
the environmental harms that will result but rather requires

over, pollution controls determined by reference to available technologies may
impose very high costs for the health and environmental benefits that are
gained. See infra note 210.
116. See Brundtland Report, supranote 12, at 71 ("The common theme throughout
this strategy for sustainable development is the need to integrate economic and
ecological considerations in decision making. They are, after all, integrated
in the workings of the real world. This will require a change in attitudes and
objectives and in institutional arrangements at every level.").
117. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-

4370f (2006).
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an agency to consider the anticipated adverse environmental
impacts of a proposal before taking the action.'
When an agency action may "significantly affect [] the
quality of the human environment,"1 NEPA requires
the agency to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (CEIS") 12 0 that considers alternatives to the proposed
action, 121 assesses the environmental impacts of the proposed
actions and the alternatives, 122 and allows for public involvement in the preparation of the EIS. 123
The Supreme Court has held that an agency has no obligation to modify its proposal in order to reduce or eliminate the
adverse environmental impact once it has adequately considered the environmental impacts of its proposed action. 12 4
The Court's resolution rejects the view that NEPA imposes
substantive requirements and establishes that NEPA imposes
only procedural requirements. 125 Viewed through the lens of
sustainable development, the issue presented to the Court
was whether NEPA mandates protection of the environment
despite that environmental protection's impact on the agency's interest in development. The Court decided that, after
NEPA, the agency retains the authority to pursue development interests notwithstanding the adverse environmental
impacts of the agency action, provided those impacts are
considered.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has opined that the NEPA
procedures "are almost certain to affect the agency's substantive decision."1 2 6 Presumably this effect is greater protection of the environment, as a consequence of NEPA's legal
mandate that agencies must consider the environmental
consequences of their actions. 12 7 Any such protection is only
achieved, however, because of agency deliberation about the
extent to which the agency's programmatic (development)
goals may be pursued if the project is modified or even abandoned to reduce adverse environmental impacts. 128 This is
very much an ad hoc approach, with agencies retaining the
power to sacrifice development for environmental protection
or vice versa. 12 9

The Supreme Court's view of NEPA's impact on protecting the environment may reflect the fact that an agency may
be able to accomplish its development goals in a way that
does not degrade the environment to as great an extent (or
not at all), once the impacts on the environment are considered. NEPA's impact is not, however, a consequence of substantive legal protection of the environment. Indeed, NEPA
permits the environment to be degraded significantly when
the agency understands the nature of that degradation and
decides to pursue the action that causes the environmental
degradation based on the agency's view that the benefits of
the action outweigh the harm caused to the environment.1 30

118. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
120. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11.
121. Id. § 1502.14.
122. Id. 1502.16.
123. Id. 1503.1(a)(4).
124. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51
(1989); Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980).
125. See, e.g., RODGERS, supranote 39, at 862-63.
126. Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 350.
127. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1045, 1049 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). The court recognized both that "Congress, in NEPA, made environmental considerations part of the SEC's substantive mission," and that
"environmental concerns to some extent run counter to the SEC's primary
mandate of financial protection of investors, and that there is here a substantial role for the court to play in ensuring that NEPAs procedural commands
are carried out in full measure by the SEC." Id. at 1045, 1049; ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
90 (5th ed. 2006) (NEPA "served as a catalyst for forcing federal agencies that
previously had been unresponsive to environmental concerns to incorporate
them in their decisionmaking processes.").
128. See Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 350.
129. See Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 2008).
The court stated:

130. In this respect, NEPA may be analogized to a mechanism that promotes protection of the environment without mandating it. Such mechanisms are discussed infra in Part C.
131. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2006).
132. See JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF Toxic SUBSTANCES AND
H-AZARDOUs WASTES 551-52 (2000) ("FIFRA ... requires that all pesticides be
registered and have their labeling approved. In addition, regulatory restrictions
are most often imposed through the cancellation or suspension (or modification) of existing registrations.").
133. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5). The statute provides:
The Administrator shall register a pesticide if the Administrator determines that, when considered with any restrictions imposed under subsection (d) of this section- (A) its composition is such as to warrant
the proposed claims for it; (B) its labeling and other material required
to be submitted comply with the requirements of this subchapter; (C)
it will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment; and (D) when used in accordance with
widespread and commonly recognized practice it will not generally
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.

A Mandate for Regulatory Action W hen
Threatened Environmental Harm Outweighs
Societal Benefit

2.

FIFRA131 regulates pesticides and related products by allowing their sale only when EPA has registered the products and
defined guidelines for their use. 132 Pesticide registration is
required when EPA determines that "when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice
[the pesticide] will not generally cause unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment." 33 The statute defines "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" as the "economic,
social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide."13 4
FIFRA accordingly requires EPA to take regulatory action
needed to permit the sale of pesticides based on a "cost-benefit analysis" that balances the two principal components of
sustainable development.1 35 This regulatory approach contrasts with NEPA, which permits an agency to act in a way
In this case, it would not violate NEPA if the EIS noted that granting
the permits would result in the permanent, irreversible destruction of
the entire Florida Everglades, but the Corps decided that economic
benefits outweighed that negative environmental impact. That capricious decision might run afoul of a duty imposed by a different statute, but it would not violate any duty imposed by NEPA.

Id.

Id.
134. § 136(bb) ("The term 'unreasonable adverse effects on the environment' means
(1) any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account
the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide. . . .").
135. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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that harms the environment despite the lack of an offsetting
developmental benefit, as long as the adverse impacts were
considered. 13 6 FIFRA rather reflects Congress's judgment
that pesticides should be available for sale whenever the benefits of use are expected to outweigh the costs.
FIFRA also requires that EPA engage in a periodic review
of pesticide registration. 13 7 Indeed, EPA may cancel the pesticide's registration 38 if, based on this review or for some other
reason, 13 9 it "appears to the Administrator that a pesticide ...
when used in accordance with widespread and commonly
recognized practice, generally causes unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment."140
In short, FIFRA's regulatory regime is dependent on the
cost-benefit analysis dictated by the statute's definition of the
"unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" that trigger regulatory action. Judicial interpretation of that standard
has accorded substantial deference to EPA's judgment regarding risks to public health and the environment.14 1

3.

A Mandate to Permit Development When its
Benefits Clearly Outweigh Important Harms
to the Environment

One might expect that the ESA 142 would be easy to locate
along the sustainable development continuum. Its purposes
are "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation
of such endangered species and threatened species." 143 Given
these purposes and the precariousness of the environmental
amenities that the statute is intended to protect, one would
expect that the statute would be firmly located on the environmental protection side of the protection-development
spectrum.
This is indeed how the Supreme Court understood the
statute in Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v. Hill. 4 4 In that
famous case, the Court had to decide whether the TVA's
decision to complete work on the Tellico Dam violated the
ESA, because that government action would have caused the
136. See supranote 127 and accompanying text.
137. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(g)(1)(A) (2006) (generally requiring registration review
every fifteen years).
138. Id. § 136d(b). This authority to cancel pesticide registration is supplemented
by EPA's authority to suspend registration during the time when the procedure for cancellation is pursued, i.e., when an "imminent hazard" is present.
See id. § 136d(c)(1) ("If the Administrator determines that action is necessary
to prevent an imminent hazard during the time required for cancellation or
change in classification proceedings, the Administrator may, by order, suspend
the registration of the pesticide immediately.").
139. See id § 136d(g)(1).
140. Id. § 136d(b).
141. See, e.g., Envd. Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 E2d 998, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(affirming EPA Administrator's decision to suspend the registration of pesticides heptachlor and chlordane under the FIFRA for certain uses because
Administrator properly found pesticides posed carcinogenic risks to humans).
142. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
143. Id. § 1531(b). The Supreme Court has described the ESA as the "most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted
by any nation." Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmties for a Great Oregon,
515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995) (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 180 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
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extirpation of the snail darter, an endangered species.145 In
this conflict between the development that would have been
promoted by construction of the dam14 6 and the preservation
of the snail darter,1 47 the Court concluded that:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision
whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively command all
federal agencies "to insure that actions authorized,funded,
or carriedout by them do not jeopardize the continued existence" of an endangered species or "result in the destruction
or modification of habitat of such species ..... 16 U.S.C. §
1536 (1976 ed.). (Emphasis added.) This language admits of
no exception.14 8
The Court relied as well on the statute's legislative history
in concluding that Congress had placed a thumb firmly on
the side of environmental protection when enacting the ESA.
In particular, the Court emphasized the final 1973 statute's
difference from earlier legislation and draft legislation, all of
which "qualified the obligation of federal agencies by stating that they should seek to preserve endangered species only
insofar as is practicable and consistent with their primary
purposes."'49 The Court found it "very significant" that the
1973 ESA contained no such qualifications.1 50 The Court's
conclusion, in short, was that:
The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to
halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies
of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute ....
The pointed omission of the type of qualifying language
previously included in endangered species legislation reveals
a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species
priority over the "primary missions" of federal agencies.15'
The Court accordingly rejected the claim "that in this
case the burden on the public through the loss of millions of
unrecoverable dollars would greatly outweigh the loss of the
snail darter,"15 2 concluding instead that Congress had mandated that the species be preserved. 15 3
145. Id. at 172-73.
146. See id. at 157 ("Tellico [Dam] is a multipurpose regional development project
designed principally to stimulate shoreline development, generate sufficient
electric current to heat 20,000 homes, and provide flatwater recreation and
flood control, as well as improve economic conditions in an area characterized
by underutilization of human resources and outmigration of young people.")
(footnote, internal quotations, and citation omitted).
147. See id. at 158-59. The court characterized the situation as follows:
Exploring the area around Coytee Springs, which is about seven miles
from the mouth of the [Little Tennessee] river [where the Tellico Dam
was being constructed], a University of Tennessee ichthyologist, Dr.
David A. Etnier, found a previously unknown species of perch, the
snail darter, or Percina (Imostoma) tanasi. This [was a] three-inch,
tannish-colored fish, whose numbers are estimated to be in the range
of 10,000 to 15,000.
Id. (footnote omitted).
148. Id. at 173.
149. Id. at 181 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
150. Id. at 182.
151. Id. at 184-85.
152. Id. at 187.
153. See id. at 188 ("[T]he plain language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative
history, shows clearly that Congress viewed the value of endangered species as
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Following the Court's pro-environmental protection decision in Hill, Congress revisited the issue of the degree to
which the ESA should provide unconditional protection for
endangered species against governmental action. In November 1978, less than six months after the Hill decision, Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act Amendments of
1978.154 This statute modified the substantive requirements of
section 7, the key provision in Hill. Congress also established
the Endangered Species Committee to adjudicate requests
for exemptions from the Secretary of the Interior's determination that an agency action would likely "jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary,
after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be
critical."155
The seven-person Committee must grant an exemption if
at least five members vote for an exemption, based primarily
on two critical determinations: first, that "there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action" and
second, that "the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the
benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat, and such action is
in the public interest."156 Congress thereby added conditions
to the protection of endangered species that the Court had
not found in Hill and relocated the statute along the sustainable development spectrum so that it now provides for a
balancing of environmental protection against development
interests in deciding whether to permit particular government actions, notwithstanding their catastrophically adverse

impact on endangered species.15 7 In sum, the ESA mandates
that the Committee provide relief in favor of development,
but only when developmental benefits "clearly outweigh" the
harm to the environment and when a supermajority (five of
the seven Committee members) reaches that conclusion.158

C.

As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants and animals
evolved, and as we increase the pressure for products that they are in
a position to supply (usually unwillingly) we threaten their-and our
own-genetic heritage.

The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable.

From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interests
of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations. The reason
is simple: they are potential resources. They are keys to puzzles which
we cannot solve, and may provide answers to questions which we have
not yet learned to ask.

Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of
plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? ... Sheer
self-interest impels us to be cautious.

The institutionalization of that caution lies at the heart of H.R. 37
Id. at 178 (first, third, and fourth omission in original) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973)).
154. Endangered Species Amendment Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat.
3751 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1536, 1538-1540,
1542).

155. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(2006).
156. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A). The exemption is also dependent on two other subsidiary
findings.

Shifting the Applicable Regulatory Regime Along
the Sustainable Development Spectrum

The preceding sections demonstrate that U.S. environmental law takes very different approaches to sustainable
development when a variety of environmental statutes is
considered. This wide variety of approaches is arguably even
more striking when one considers that there are particular
federal statutes or regulatory contexts in which more than
one approach may be applicable in addressing the environmental issue. This Section examines the statutes that employ
the shifting approach. The nature of the shift, however, varies greatly: one statute modifies its approach to sustainable
development based on the regulatory response that the statute authorizes;' one statute shifts its regulatory approach
in different statutorily mandated phases of regulation;' 60 one
statute supplements an environmentally protective regime
with technology-based requirements;16 1 one statute changes
its regulatory approach when an environmental problem is
addressed at the state or at the federal level;162 and one statute supplements legally mandated standards with a requirement that information about residual risks be reported to the
affected public. 16 These shifts in sustainable development
approaches will be considered in turn.

I.
'incalculable."'). The Court here was quoting from the House Report which
the Court had quoted more extensively earlier in the opinion:

Summer 20| |

Varying the Regulatory Approach Based on the
Degree of Concern About Harm to Health and
the Environment and the Costs of Regulation

Congress enacted TSCA164 in 1976 to protect the public from
the unreasonable risks posed by hazardous chemicals.1 65 The
statute pursues two complementary regulatory approaches:
developing information about the risks posed by certain substances' 66 and imposing regulatory controls to protect the
157. Even when first enacted in 1973, the ESA had one part that reflected the sort
of balancing that Congress required for the determination ofexemptions from
the section 7 prohibition. The statute defines an "endangered species" as:
[A] ny species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species of the Class Insecta
determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions ofthis chapter would present an over-whelming and
overriding risk to man.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(6)(2006). Thus, in defining the species that it is intended to
protect, the statute omits certain species that are determined overwhelmingly
to be harmful to humans.
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(2006).
159. See infra Part C.1.
160. See infra Part C.2.
161. See infra Part C.3.
162. See infra Part C.4.
163. See infra Part C.5.
164. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2006).
2601(a)-(b).
165. See id
166. See id. § 2601(b)(1) ("[A]dequate data should be developed with respect to
the effect of chemical substances and mixtures on health and the environment
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public from unreasonably risky products.1 67 The statute also
establishes an overarching goal of accomplishing these objectives without unreasonably hindering economic development.' 68 TSCA employs four different regulatory approaches
to the substances it regulates: (1) mandatory pre-manufacture notification for new chemicals (and for some new uses
of existing chemicals);1 6 9 (2) reporting and recordkeeping
requirements for chemicals subject to regulation that are not
new;170 (3) EPA rulemaking seeking additional information
about the risks posed by a chemical;1 71 and (4) regulatory
controls on the production or use of a chemical. 1 72
The first approach applies when a chemical is not included
on the TSCA chemical substance inventory,17 3 maintained
by EPA in accordance with TSCA's requirements. 74 A person may only produce such a new chemical after notifying
EPA ninety days before beginning manufacturing.1 7 5 When
the person provides this notice, the person must also submit
to EPA "data which the person submitting the data believes
show that .

.

. the manufacture, processing, distribution in

commerce, use, and disposal of the chemical substance or
any combination of such activities will not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment . . . ."7
In order to locate this requirement along the sustainable
development spectrum, one must identify the implicit judgment being made by the producer of a new substance when
providing the required notice. That producer has made the
judgment that the new substance "will not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment."17 7 To be
sure, the statutory standard refers to an "unreasonable risk,"
which necessitates a balancing of adverse environmental
(including health) impacts against productive benefits, and
thus appears to be the balancing approach.178 In this context, however, the producer of the substance, rather than the
regulatory agency, is doing the balancing.1 7 9 Moreover, the
producer is not required to undertake new studies of adverse

167.

168.

169.
170.

and ... the development of such data should be the responsibility of those who
manufacture and those who process such chemical substances and mixtures.").
See id § 2601(b)(2) ("[A]dequate authority should exist to regulate chemical
substances and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment . . . .").
See id. § 2601(a)(3) ("[A]uthority over chemical substances and mixtures
should be exercised in such a manner as not to impede unduly or create unnecessary economic barriers to technological innovation . . . ."); id. § 2601(c) ("It
is the intent of Congress that the Administrator shall carry out this chapter in a
reasonable and prudent manner, and that the Administrator shall consider the
environmental, economic, and social impact of any action the Administrator
takes or proposes to take under this chapter.").
See id. § 2604.
See id § 2607.

171. Seeki.i

2603.

172. See id § 2605.
4
173. See id. § 260 (a).
174. See id § 2607 (b)(1) ("The Administrator shall compile, keep current, and
publish a list of each chemical substance which is manufactured or processed
in the United States."). EPA reports that this list currently includes more than
84,000 chemicals. New Chemicals Program, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/oppt/newchems/pubs/invntory.htm (last updated Feb. 11,
2011).

175. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1).
176. Id. § 2604(b) (2) (B).
177. Id § 2604(b) (2) (B)(i).
178. See supra Part III.B.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b)(2)(B).
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effects when weighing the costs and benefits of production.80
The balancing, accordingly, is likely to include a thumb on
the side of production, especially given the company's commercial interest in selling the new product on the market.
The second approach applies after a substance has been
made available on the market and involves mandatory reporting and recordkeeping requirements." These requirements
arguably reflect a preference for the environmental protection side of the spectrum. Chemicals subject to these requirements are presumptively chemicals that do not "present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment,"18 2
because they have been allowed to enter the stream of commerce. These statutory requirements applicable to products
on the market are more protective of health and the environment because they require the maintenance and reporting
of information relevant to the existence of such risks, without any prior showing of risk.183 If the statute had continued
to place a thumb on the side of development, as with the
pre-manufacture notice requirement, the statute could have
included only the independent statutory requirement that
a producer inform EPA immediately when that person has
"information which reasonably supports the conclusion that
[a] substance or mixture presents a substantial risk of injury
to health or the environment."1 4 Instead, TSCA supplements this specific "substantial risk" reporting requirement
with the other reporting and recordkeeping requirements
that apply regardless of information that the product has
caused such a risk.18 5
The third regulatory approach is a more targeted information-based reporting requirement for companies placing
on the market chemicals that pose potentially significant
risks to the environment or health. This requirement applies
when EPA concludes that, "the manufacture, distribution in
commerce, processing, use, or disposal of a chemical substance . . . may present an unreasonable risk of injury to

health or the environment."1 6 If, in such a situation, "there
are insufficient data and experience upon which the effects
of such . .. substance . .. on health or the environment can

reasonably be determined or predicted"1 7 and "testing . . .is
necessary to develop such data,"" EPA must promulgate a
regulation ordering the needed testing.' Unlike the second
approach, which requires only the reporting of some market
information, this regulatory approach requires the development of new information about the environment and health
impacts of a chemical available on the market.
The trigger for this requirement accounts only for the
environmental (and health) harm components of sustainable
development. Indeed, the testing requirement is triggered by
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. 2607.
Id. 2604(a)(1).
See id. § 2607(a).
Id. § 2607(e). Reporting is not required if the producer "has actual knowledge"

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

that EPA has already been informed of the information.
Id § 2607(a)-(d).
Id. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(i).
Id. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(ii).
Id. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(iii).
Id. § 2603(a).
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the potential for harm to health or the environment rather
than a showing of actual harm being caused.o Moreover,
the decision to promulgate a testing rule does not account for
the consequential developmental benefits of producing the
chemical. In short, when determining whether to impose the
information-based requirement of testing, the statute directs
EPA to account only for adverse environmental and health
impacts.
The fourth and last of the regulatory approaches adopted
by TSCA is command and control regulation of the chemical in the marketplace."' EPA is required to impose regulatory controls for a chemical upon finding "that there is a
reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture . . . of a
chemical substance . . . presents or will present an unreason-

able risk of injury to health or the environment." 19 2 Although
the obligation to impose regulatory requirements is triggered
by a focus on the environmental impacts of the sustainable
development,1 93 EPA may impose regulations only "to the
extent necessary to protect adequately against such risk using
the least burdensome requirements."
The statute clarifies that, when determining the "least burdensome requirements," EPA must balance the two fundamental components
of sustainable development against each other: protection
of the environment and promotion of economic development.195 Thus, along with consideration of how the substance
affects health 96 and the environment,1 9 7 the statute dictates
that EPA consider "the benefits of such substance ... and the
availability of substitutes"" and "the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after consideration
of the effect on the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and public health."9
190. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 859 E2d 977, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("To issue
a test rule, EPA need not find that a substance actually does cause or present an
'unreasonable risk."').
191. See id. § 2605.
192. Id. § 2605(a).
193. This command and control regulatory trigger does, however, dictate an EPA
finding that "there is a reasonable basis to conclude" that the substance "presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." Id. This standard requires clearer evidence of the dangers resulting from
exposure to a chemical than the standard for product testing, which requires
only a finding that the chemical at issue "may present an unreasonable risk of
injury to health or the environment." Id.§ 2603(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
194. Id. § 2605(a). The statute itself identifies seven regulatory requirements from
which EPA is required to choose the "least burdensome requirements." The
listed requirements range from a prohibition of the manufacturing of the substance to public notice of the risk presented by the substance.
195. See id. § 2605(c)(1).
196. I. 2605(c)(1)(A).
197. Id. 2605(c)(1)(B).
198. Id. § 2605(c) (1) (C).
199. Id. 2605(c)(1)(D). In CorrosionProofFittings v. EPA, the court considered
whether EPA complied with § 2605(c) in promulgating a regulatory ban on
"the future manufacture, importation, processing, and distribution of asbestos
in almost all products." The court concluded that EPA had failed to engage in
the required balancing of the costs and benefits of regulation:
The EPA would have this court believe that Congress, when it enacted its requirement that the EPA consider the economic impacts
of its regulations, thought that spending $200-300 million to save
approximately seven lives (approximately $30-40 million per life) over
thirteen years is reasonable.

The EP~s willingness to argue that spending $23.7 million to save less
than one-third of a life reveals that its economic review of its regula-
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In sum, TSCA's provisions reflect a range of regulatory
approaches, the applicability of which reflects different
aspects of sustainable development. One notable feature of
the statute's regulatory structure is that the less intrusive
information-based regulatory requirements apply in contexts where the statute is more protective of the environment.
When TSCA imposes environmentally protective regulatory
requirements without a prior showing that they are warranted
based on a weighing of costs and benefits, TSCA employs a
less intrusive and less costly regulatory approach. The statute's more costly command and control requirements, on
the other hand, are applicable only after a rigid weighing of
the value of environmental protection against the economic
impact of the regulations. The appeal of this type of approach
is that requirements with significant economic costs are only
imposed when the effects of the regulations are not unduly
onerous when weighed against the expected benefits of protecting the environment. 20 0

2.

Regulatory Requirements that Begin with
Available Controls and Later Require
Consideration of the Need for Enhanced
Controls

After the 1990 Amendments, the CAA's regulatory approach
toward the control of hazardous air pollutant emissions
reflects an ambivalent regulatory approach toward sustainable development. 20 1 Section 112 establishes baseline regulatory requirements that are presumptively defined by available
technologies. Although the Act generally provides that the
categorical standards defined by EPA must reflect consideration of "the cost of achieving such emission reduction,
and any non-air quality health and environmental impacts
and energy requirements," 2 02 the Act prescribes the minimum stringency for the standard by reference to the degree
of emissions control being achieved by sources within the
category of sources. Thus, the Act provides that "[t]he maximum degree of reduction in emissions that is deemed achievable for new sources in a category or subcategory shall not be
tions, as required by TSCA, was meaningless. As the petitioners' brief
and our review of EPA caselaw reveals, such high costs are rarely, if
ever, used to support a safety regulation. If we were to allow such
cavalier treatment of the EPA's duty to consider the economic effects
of its decisions, we would have to excise entire sections and phrases
from the language of TSCA. Because we are judges, not surgeons, we
decline to do so.
947 E2d at 1201, 1207, 1223 (5th Cir. 1991) (footnote omitted).
200. This regulatory approach may paradoxically permit greater concern with economic development than the CWAs thumb-on-the-scale approach, which
looks toward available technologies to define pollution control requirements.
See supra Part III.A.2. The fact that a technology is available does not mean it
is reasonable to pay the costs of pollution control that result from its use. Compare infra note 210 (discussing the court's estimate that the technology-based
limit for air emissions of benzene would be more than $160 million for each
life saved), with supra note 199 (discussing court's judgment that it is irrational
in balancing the costs and benefits of control to require expenditures of just
more than $23 million to save each life).
201. The CAA defines a regime of regulations of hazardous air pollutants that is
independent of the regulations ofcriteria pollutants, which is described in Part
I.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2)(2006).
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less stringent than the emission control that is achieved in
practice by the best controlled similar source." 20 3 Emissions
standards for existing sources may be less stringent than the
new source standards, but must be at least as stringent as
"the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing twelve percent of the existing sources (for which the
Administrator has emissions information)" in the category. 20 4
In short, the CAA mandates that the initial standards for
hazardous air pollutants be defined solely by reference to the
technologies available for pollution controls to the sources
being regulated. 205
Because the availability of technological controls determines the baseline level of controls for hazardous air pollutants, except in special circumstances, 20 6 the CAAs approach
to the regulation of hazardous air pollutants is very similar to
the CWA approach to defining effluent limits for industrial
dischargers.20 7 That regime is unconcerned with whether the
controls are affordable for individual sources 208 or with the
marginal benefit of incremental improvements in pollution
controls. 209 The standards imposed pursuant to the statute
may therefore result in control costs that are quite high in
relation to the benefits they achieve, despite the reliance on
available technology.210
These technology-based standards are not, however, the
statute's final word regarding required limits on emissions
of hazardous air pollutants. Section 112 provides for a conditional, more stringent stage of emission controls. Whether
more stringent emissions limitations are necessary depends
on the nature of the residual risk that remains after the application of the first, technology-based phase of controls. With
respect to residual risks to human health, the statute provides
that EPA must within eight years after the initial standards
"promulgate standards for such category or subcategory if
promulgation of such standards is required in order to provide an ample margin of safety to protect public health."2 11
With specific regard to residual risks of cancer, the statute
requires EPA to promulgate more stringent standards "[i]
f [the technology-based] standards . . . do not reduce life203. Id. § 7412(d)(3).
204. Id. § 7412(d)(3)(A). The statute provides that when a category or subcategory
has fewer than 30 sources, the standard must not be less than "the average
emission limitation achieved by the best performing 5 sources (for which the
Administrator has or could reasonably obtain emissions information) in the
category or subcategory." Id. § 7412(d) (3) (B).
205. Section 112 does provide that the degree of control determined by the methods defined above may be replaced by a more stringent standard of control.
Under § 7412(d)(2), EPA must establish standards more stringent than these
floor standards when more stringent standards are determined to be achievable
accounting for factors including costs and non-air quality impacts.

206. See supranote 201.
207. See supranotes 67-70 and accompanying text.
208. See supranote 81 and accompanying text.
209. The CWA provides for broad consideration of the total, not the marginal, costs
of pollution control. See supranote 79 and accompanying text.
210. See Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 19 E3d 1201, 1210 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he several benzene NESHAPs create costs as high as $168.2
million per premature death averted."). This cost per life saved is significantly higher than the cost-per-life saved that the Corrosion Proof Fittings court
viewed as unreasonably high. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 E2d
1201, 1223 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The EPA's willingness to argue that spending
$23.7 million to save less than one-third of a life reveals that its economic
review of its regulations, as required by TSCA, was meaningless.").
211. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2006).
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time excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to
emissions from a source in the category or subcategory to
less than one in one million." 212 Regarding risks to human
health, therefore, the statute moves firmly in the direction of
the protection side of the sustainable development spectrum
and decisively away from the development side.
More stringent, second-phase standards may also be necessary when the residual risk is posed to the environment. 2 13
The Act requires more stringent standards when necessary "to
prevent, taking into consideration costs, energy, safety, and
other relevant factors, an adverse environmental effect." 2 14
Although this enhanced standard to protect against environmental effects moves away from the development side of the
sustainable development spectrum, the second-phase standard does not move as far toward environmental protection
as the health-based standard. Rather, the environmentalimpact-based standard is determined through a case by case
balancing of adverse environmental impacts against the costs
associated with imposing a more stringent emissions control
requirement. The environmental-impact-based standard is
thus more consistent with the balancing principle of sustainable development.
In sum, the regulation of toxic air pollutants in the CAA
reflects each of the three important points along the spectrum of sustainable development. It establishes baseline
controls with a focus on development and then mandates
enhanced control that is dependent on the nature of the risk
posed by the pollution. The statute addresses residual risks to
health with a strong preference for protection, while balancing the costs of reducing residual risks to the environment
with development impacts.

3.

Supplementing a Health-Based Regime with
Available Technology Standards

RCRA2 15 regulates the handling, treatment, and disposal of
hazardous wastes. 21 6 Unlike the regulatory regimes of FIFRA
and TSCA, both of which regulate the sale and use of products, RCRA applies only to substances meeting the statute's
definition of "solid waste." 2 17 RCRA's approach to sustainable development can be understood from two important
perspectives. First, the manner in which the statute defines
the scope of "hazardous waste" subject to regulation demonstrates the statute's elevation of protecting health and the
environment over the costs of control. RCRA's stringent
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Id.

215. 42 U.S.C.

§§

6901-6992k (2006).

216. Id. The statute also regulates disposal of nonhazardous wastes in Subchapter

IV (42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949). The discussion in the text addresses the more
stringent requirements applicable to hazardous wastes.
217. See id. § 6903(27) ("The term 'solid waste' means any garbage, refuse, sludge
from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution
control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid,
or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining,
and agricultural operations, and from community activities . . . ."). Because
this term identifies one limit on the scope of RCRANs applicability, its meaning
has been quite controversial. See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 E3d 50
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
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regulatory requirements for the handling, storage, treatment,
and disposal of hazardous wastes are applicable only when
the statutorily defined solid waste is also hazardous waste. 218
The statute provides that solid waste is hazardous waste when
it "may ... pose a substantial present or potential hazard to
human health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of,or otherwise managed." 219
The statute accordingly imposes regulatory controls based on
up to three degrees of uncertain risk: waste is hazardous when
it "may" give rise to "potential hazard" as a consequence of
being "improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed
of, or otherwise managed."22 0
EPA has promulgated regulations that establish two ways
to identify waste as hazardous: such wastes may be listed as
hazardous by EPA22 1 or they may exhibit characteristics of
toxicity, reactivity, corrosivity, or ignitability when tested in
accordance with standards defined by EPA regulations. 22 2
EPA has also promulgated regulations that define a substance
that is mixed with or derived from a listed hazardous waste
as hazardous waste. 2 23 In American Chemistry Council v. EPA,
industry challenged this regulation, contending that EPA did
not have statutory authority to regulate substances that did
not meet the requirements for a characteristic waste. 2 24 The
court held that RCRA was sufficiently ambiguous to have
delegated to EPA the authority to regulate substances mixed
with listed hazardous waste as hazardous waste itself: "The
element of judgment imported into the definition of hazardous waste by the use of 'may' and the inclusion of waste that
may be hazardous only if mismanaged necessarily makes the
statute ambiguous on this score." 2 25 The court also concluded
that EPA's regulatory definition was reasonable, because "[t]
he Final Rule fulfills the purpose for which the Congress
passed the RCRA, namely to subject hazardous waste to 'cradle-to-grave' regulation in order to protect public health and
the environment." 22 6
When a regulated party has generated hazardous waste,
that person must comply with RCRA's regime for tracking
the waste and ensuring that the disposal is proper. With
218. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-25 (2006).
219. Id. The full definition is as follows:
The term "hazardous waste" means a solid waste, or combination of
solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical,
chemical, or infectious characteristics may(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or
an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or
the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or
disposed of, or otherwise managed.

Id.
220. Id.
221. See 40 C.ER. §§ 261.31-33 (2010). These wastes are described as listed wastes.
222. See 40 C.ER. §§ 261.21-24 (2010). These wastes are described as characteristic wastes. EPA may list a waste even though the waste does not have the
characteristics that would make the waste a characteristic waste. See Dithiocarbamate Task Force v. EPA, 98 E3d 1394, 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing
wastes listed by EPA that would not have met testing threshold for characteristic wastes).
223. See 40 C.FR. § 261.3 (2010).
224. See Am. Chemistry Council v. EPA, 337 E3d 1060, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
225. Id. at 1064.
226. Id. at 1065 (citation omitted).
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regard to disposal, a core requirement of RCRA is the ban
on land disposal imposed by the 1984 Amendments. 22 7
The amended statute bars land disposal unless the hazardous waste has been treated in accordance with regulations
defining "levels or methods of treatment, if any, which substantially diminish the toxicity of the waste or substantially
reduce the likelihood of migration of hazardous constituents
from the waste so that short-term and long-term threats to
human health and the environment are minimized."2 28 This
requirement is defined by reference only to the human health
and environmental impact side of the sustainable development spectrum and is analogous to the CAA's treatment of
the attainment principle for criteria pollutants.
EPA promulgated regulations defining treatment requirements in accordance with an implementation schedule
defined by Congress. 22 9 Litigation that grew out of industry challenges to EPA regulations implementing the RCRA
treatment standards reinforces the understanding that
RCRA's statutory standard focuses on protection of human
health and the environment rather than on economic development. In challenging an early regulation establishing treatment standards, the Chemical Manufacturers Association
("CMA") contended that the standard established by EPA
was an unreasonable interpretation of the statute because it
required the application of treatment technology despite the
fact that, in some circumstances, treatment was not required
to minimize risk to human health; the standard necessitated
treatment for treatment's sake. 2 30 The D.C. Circuit rejected
this challenge, holding that the statute permitted EPA to
prescribe treatment methods for hazardous waste in order to
minimize risks to human health. 2 31 The court held that EPA's
interpretation of the statute was reasonable because RCRA
provides for "regulations specifying [] methods or levels of
treatment," and the uncertainty in assessing risk supported
the reasonableness of relying on technology requirements
instead. 2 32 The court noted that none of the levels that CMA
argued as appropriate under RCRA met the requisite level of
safety.2 33 In short, because RCRA was intended to minimize
risks to human health and the environment, the statute delegated substantial discretion to EPA in defining adequately
safe treatment standards. 2 34
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1) (2006).
228. See id. § 6924(m)(1).
229. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 976 F.2d 2, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (describing phased implementation of treatment requirements).
230. Hazardous WasteTreatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 361-63 (D.C. Cit.
1989).
231. Id. at 361-62 (concluding that "the statute does not unambiguously and in all
circumstances foreclose EPA from adopting treatment levels based upon the
levels achievable by BADT [Best Available Demonstrated Technology]").
232. Id. at 361, 363.
233. Id. at 362-63 ("The screening levels that EPA initially proposed were not
those at which the wastes were thought to be entirely safe. Rather, EPA set
the levels to reduce risks from the solvents to an 'acceptable' level, and it explored, at great length, the manifest (and manifold) uncertainties inherent in
any attempt to specify 'safe' concentration levels. . . . [N]one of the levels to
which CMA compares the BDAT [sic] standards purports to establish a level
at which safety is assured or 'threats to human health and the environment are
minimized."').
234. See id. at 361. The court found that EPA provided inadequate justification for
setting standards based solely on BADT, however, and remanded for a fuller
explanation. Id. at 364-66.
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A related issue arose in CMA's challenge to the final
group of treatment standards promulgated by EPA. 235 CMA
claimed that the EPA regulatory standard was unlawful
because EPA lacked authority to mandate treatment of characteristic wastes to levels of risk below the level that established the waste as having enough hazardous constituents to
trigger the applicability of the statute. 23 6 CMA contended, in
other words, that once treatment of characteristic hazardous
waste had resulted in characteristics that would not have met
EPA's tests for hazardous characteristics, 23 7 EPA no longer
had authority to impose regulatory requirements for hazardous wastes with respect to those wastes, because they were
not hazardous. The court rejected this argument, concluding that the statute "provide [s] the EPA with authority to bar
land disposal of certain wastes unless they have been treated
to reduce risks beyond those presented by the characteristics
themselves." 238
In sum, these cases addressing the implementation of the
land ban demonstrate that RCRA reflects a strong rule of risk
minimization for the sake of protecting human health and
the environment. This mandated protection does not seek to
account for the impact of the costs of control on economic
development and is applicable to the broadly defined category of "hazardous waste."
RCRAs regulatory requirements regarding land disposal
do not end, however, with the application of the thumb-onthe-environmental-protection-side treatment standards. 239
Disposing of "treated" hazardous waste on land is lawful
only if it occurs at a permitted disposal facility.2 40 In order to
receive a permit, a disposal facility must comply with command-and-control requirements intended to ensure that the
wastes do not escape the site. 2 41 These controls include double
liners, a system for collecting leachate, and a system for monitoring groundwater. 2 42 These technology-based requirements
supplement the health-based treatment standards mandated
by the land ban. They are also intended to prevent groundwater contamination by waste that has already been treated
in compliance with standards that minimize the short and
long term risk to health or the environment. Requiring this
available technology thus places additional weight on the side
of protection of health and environment on the sustainable
development spectrum. 2 43

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

240.

241.
242.

243.

See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 976 E2d at 2.
See id at 12.
See supranote 222 for a description of characteristic hazardous waste.
See Chem. Waste Mgmt. Inc., 976 E2d at 14.
If hazardous waste is treated in accordance with the applicable treatment standards, the treated waste may be disposed of at a permitted hazardous waste
disposal facility. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m)(2)(2006).
See 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(5) (requiring that generators of hazardous waste use
4
permitted facilities for disposal); id. § 6923(a)( ) (requiring that transporters
of hazardous waste transport waste for disposal to permitted facilities).
4
See id. § 692 (o).
See id. § 6924(o)(1)(A). Some of these design requirements may be waived if
the facility demonstrates that alternative controls are at least as protective as the
required design technology. See id. § 6924(o)(2).
RCRA permits land disposal of hazardous wastes that have not been treated
prior to disposal only when disposal is in a deep injection well that will not
permit the migration of hazardous constituents out of the contained well. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(d)-(g); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 907 E2d
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The distinguishing characteristic of RCRA regulation is
its double layer of protection from the risks posed by hazardous wastes. The regulatory regime seeks to prevent risks arising from land disposal of wastes by first treating the wastes to
conform to a health-based safety standard and then imposing technological controls that ensure protection against any
residual risks of disposal. This approach contrasts with the
other multiple layer of protection regime-the CAAs treatment of hazardous air pollutants. 2 44 In that regime, the statute first mandates technology-based standards, then requires
the application of health-based standards when those standards are necessary to minimize the level of residual risk
remaining from the technology-based standards control over
air emissions. 2 45

4.

Applying Alternate Standards for the Cleanup
of Hazardous Substance Releases

Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to provide for the
cleanup of releases of hazardous substances into the environment. 246 The law was prompted by widespread public concern that had grown out of several harrowing environmental
emergencies, the most prominent of which occurred in New
York as a consequence of the wholly inadequate disposal of
dangerous chemicals at the Love Canal site. 2 47 CERCLA
granted the federal government and other parties the authority to conduct response actions when there has been a release
of hazardous substances into the environment or there is a
significant threat that hazardous substances will be released
into the environment.2 48
In considering how this statute reflects sustainable development principles, two aspects of the statute are particularly
significant. First, the statute aggressively protects human
health and the environment. For example, the statute's trigger for authority to pursue a response action is easily met. A
response action may be pursued when there has been "a release
or significant threat of a release of hazardous substances into
the environment." 2 49 The release or threatened release need
not meet or exceed any defined amount or risk threshold. 25 0
Indeed, the statute provides enhanced enforcement authorities in circumstances where the release or threatened release
"may cause "an imminent and substantial endangerment to
the public health or welfare or the environment." 2 51 More1146, 1151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reviewing regulations implementing deep
injection well provision).
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A)(2006).
245. See supra Part I.
246. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
247. See Michael P Healy, Direct Liabilityfor HazardousSubstance Cleanups Under
CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W REs. L. REv. 65, 68-69
(1992).
248. See 42 U.S.C. 9604(a)(1)(A),(B); see also Healy, supra note 247, at 69-71.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
250. See id. CERCLA also includes a broad definition of hazardous substances,
which includes substances identified as hazardous under other federal statutes,
see id. § 9601(14), or identified as hazardous by EPA under CERCLA itself. See
id. § 9602(a).
251. Id. § 9606(a). In such circumstances, EPA may issue an administrative order
requiring a response action or may seek relief in federal district court. See id. §
9606(c).
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over, CERCLA provides that a variety of parties, including
EPA, the state, or a private party, may perform the cleanup, 25 2
which means that protective action does not have to wait for
government action. Finally, the Act mandates cleanup standards sufficient to protect human health 253 and establishes a
preference for permanent remedies, regardless of the higher
costs with which they are associated. 25 4
In addition to being aggressively protective of the environment, CERCLA imposes strict liability 255 on parties with
prescribed relationships to the location of the hazardous
substance release. 25 6 The very protective cleanup standards
mandated by the statute have yielded permanent cleanups
whose average costs are very high and whose time periods for
implementation are quite lengthy.25 7
One consequence of the minimal trigger for the CERCLA response actions is that many sites across the country
may be subject to the costly CERCLA response action and
the related strict liability regime. 258 This threat of liability,
with its potentially expansive scope, has made it difficult to
redevelop former industrial sites, typically located in urban
areas, for productive use. 259 These areas are known as brownfields. 2 60 As a result, development is instead pursued at other,
252. See 40 C.ER. § 300.700(a) (2009) ("any person may undertake a response
action to reduce or eliminate a release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant.").
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1) ("Remedial actions . . . shall attain a degree of
cleanup of hazardous substances ... released into the environment and of control of further release at a minimum which assures protection of human health
and the environment."). This health-based standard for cleanups provides context for the Act's further requirement that the protection of health standard
be met in a cost-effective way. Id. § 9621(b)(1) ("The President shall select a
remedial action that is protective of human health and the environment, that
is cost effective"); see also 40 C.FR. § 300.430(f)(1)(i)(A).
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) ("Remedial actions in which treatment which
permanently and significantly reduces the volume, toxicity or mobility of the
hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants is a principal element, are
to be preferred over remedial actions not involving such treatment.").
255. See Healy, supra note 247, at 86-87.
256. See id. at 87-96. The statute established only limited defenses for the categories
of parties that the statute identified as liable. See id. at 96-99.
257. See RICHARD L. REvEsz, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 734-35 (2008)
(summarizing studies finding that the average cost of a remedial action is between $20 and $30 million, and last for an average period of twelve years).
258. EPA reported recently that more than 12,000 sites are included in the agency's list of active sites. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FY 2007 SUPERFUND ANNUAL
REPORT 2 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp/pdfs/
sf annual-report_2007.pdf. More than 1,500 of those sites are included on
the National Priorities List ("NPL"), the listing of the sites posing the greatest
hazard to public health and the environment. See id. Federal Superfund money
is available to perform permanent remedial actions only at sites listed on the
NPL. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1).
259. John S. Applegate, Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and EnvironmentalJustice:
Evaluating the Brownfields Bargain, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 243,
243-44 (1997-98) (CERCLAs "broad liability and [] stringent clean-up requirements ... make reuse of such [former industrial] property a risky venture
because it is usually contaminated to a greater or lesser degree with hazardous substances.") (footnote omitted); see also 25 Years of Superfund Liability:
ProgressMade, ProgressNeeded, 37 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 104 (Jan. 13,
2006) [hereinafter 25 Years ofSuperfund Liability] (describing how state voluntary cleanup programs developed "in response to pressure from various groups
seeking the cleanup and revitalization of contaminated urban sites to enhance
economic opportunities, to expand the job and tax base, and to reduce development sprawl."). See generally Wendy Wagner, Learningfrom Brownfields, 13
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 217, 220-27 (1997-98).
260. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A)(2006) (defining "brownfield site" as "real property the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated
by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant.").
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often agricultural sites that have no history of industrial
activity or its legacy of contamination.2 61
Many states decided to try to address this problem in
the 1990s because developers' reluctance to redevelop
brownfields was harming economic development in urban
areas and limiting state and local tax revenues. 2 62 The state
response, a "Brownfields Bargain" in the terminology of
Professor Applegate, was to moderate cleanup requirements
in order to encourage redevelopment of property. 263 The
relaxed cleanup requirements were included in state voluntary cleanup programs. 2 64 Pennsylvania, for example, provides in its cleanup standards for voluntary cleanups that
"[fiinal remedial responses under this act .

.

. shall be cost

effective." 2 65 The state cleanup programs also differed from
the CERCLA-mandated cleanup requirements in another
important respect. Permanent remedies could be defined
under CERCLA only after a substantial opportunity for
public review and comment. 2 66 State voluntary cleanup programs, on the other hand, do not require much input from
the local communities that would be affected by the cleanup
and redevelopment of the property. 2 67 One scholar has written that, "[iWn comparison to that provided under CERCLA,
the extent of liability and degree of cleanup required under
state voluntary cleanup laws [are] minimal."2 68
Given the minimal trigger for the authorization of a
response action under CERCLA and the modest cleanup
requirements established by state voluntary cleanup programs, the effectiveness of the state programs were undercut
by concerns that potential CERCLA liability remained even
261. See Statement by President George W Bush Upon Signing H.R. 2869, 38
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 52, 54-55 (Jan. 11, 2002) ("Further benefit will
come [from the statute's encouragement of brownfield redevelopment] as businesses recycle older properties and spare surrounding lands from development
.... As a consequence [of brownfields], small businesses and other employers
have located elsewhere, pushing development farther and farther outward, taking jobs with them and leaving cities empty."); Applegate, supra note 259, at
248 ("the environmental clean-up requirements of CERCLA and RCRA encourage prospective developers to eschew existing industrial land in city centers
in favor of non-industrial (typically agricultural land) at the periphery.");
262. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-66, SUPERFUND: STATE VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS PROVIDE INCENTIVES To ENCOURAGE CLEANUPS 22 (1997)

[herineafter GAO REPORT] ("By redeveloping brownfields, cities and states
hope to boost employment and tax revenue in central urban districts and reduce suburban sprawl.").
263. Applegate, supra note 259, at 244.
264. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 262, at 18.
Voluntary cleanups can be completed more quickly than cleanups under state enforcement programs, according to state officials, because
the voluntary approach eliminates some of the cleanup and enforcement steps. For the same reasons, voluntary cleanups are also less costly for both the states and volunteers. As a result, voluntary cleanups
are encouraging economic redevelopment, including that of former
industrial sites known as brownfields, by expediting the sites' return
to productive use.
Id.; see also 25 Years ofSuperfind Liability, supra note 259, at 104 ("[T]he
states generally have become innovative laboratories creating and testing new
approaches to timely and cost-effective, yet protective, cleanups that better account for the realities of real estate development.").
265. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6020.504(a) (West 2003).
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (2006).
267. See GAO REPORT, supra note 262, at 43-44 (reporting that half of programs
surveyed in the report did not include opportunities for public participation).
268. Kristen H. Engel, Brownfield Initiatives and Environmental Justice: Second-Class
CleanupsorMarket-BasedEquity?, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES &ENVTL. L. 317, 324
(1997-98).
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after a complete state voluntary cleanup. 269 Congress resolved
this incompatibility between CERCLA and the state voluntary cleanup programs by enacting the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act in January
2002.270 This statute amended CERCLA so that sites cleaned
up pursuant to state voluntary cleanup programs would not
give rise to additional liability under the federal statute.2 71
This amendment has had the effect of establishing a twotier program for the cleanup of hazardous substances. One
tier is comprised of contaminated sites that are subject only
to CERCLA's stringent standards, defined in 1980.272 The
amended statute defines this tier in the negative, by providing that only certain sites are "eligible response site[s]" for a
cleanup under state cleanup programs. 2 73 The statute defines
an "eligible response site" as a "brownfield site." 2 74 The statutory definition of a "brownfield site" identifies a number of
exclusions, 2 75 three of which are most important. A site is
eligible for cleanup under only the CERCLA regime, (1) if
a CERCLA response action is occurring at or planned for
the site, 2 76 (2) the site is listed or is eligible for listing on the
National Priorities List ("NPL"), 2 77 or (3) the site is the sub2 78
ject of a CERCLA administrative or court order. The statutory definition of an "eligible response site" reinforces the
second of these exclusions by excluding from eligibility for
cleanup under a state program a site that qualifies for NPL
listing based on a preliminary risk evaluation or otherwise
qualifies for listing on the NPL. 2 79
The second tier of sites is comprised of brownfield sites
meeting two requirements. First, the sites must have been
cleaned up pursuant to an acceptable state voluntary cleanup
program. 28 0 A state cleanup program is acceptable only if the
state
maintain[s], update[s] not less than annually, and make[s]
available to the public a record of sites, by name and location, at which response actions have been completed in the
previous year and are planned to be addressed under the
269. See GAO REPORT, supra note 262, at 46-47 ("Because EPA retains this responsibility purchasers and real estate developers are sometimes reluctant to
voluntarily clean up and redevelop sites because they fear EPA may require
them to perform additional cleanup work in the future.").
270. Small Business Liability Reliefand Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
271. See id § 231(b), 115 Stat. 2375-2381 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
9628 (2006)).
272. See supranotes 245-254 and accompanying text.
273. See 42 U.S.C. § 9628(b)(1) (2006) (providing generally that CERCLA enforcement is not permitted with respect to an "eligible response site" at which a
"response action that is in compliance with" a state cleanup program has been
completed).
274. See id. § 9601(41).
275. See id. § 9601(39)(B).
276. See id. § 9601(39)(B)(i).
277. See id. § 9601(39)(B)(ii). The NPL identifies the sites posing the greatest risk
to public health and the environment based on an evaluation of the "relative
risk or danger to public health or welfare or the environment." Id. § 9605(a)(8)
(A). This evaluation is performed by the use ofthe Hazard Ranking System. See
generally B & B Tritech, Inc. v. United States, 957 E2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(a site must be listed on the NPL in order to have a remedial action financed
by the Superfund); 40 C.ER. § 300.425(b)(1) (2009).
4
278. See 2 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(B)(iii).
279. See id. 9601(41)(C)(i). The reason for and legal significance of listing on the
NPL is described at supra note 277.
280. See id § 9628(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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State program that specifically governs response actions for
the protection of public health and the environment in the
upcoming year. The public record shall identify whether or
not the site, on completion of the response action, will be
suitable for unrestricted use and, if not, shall identify the
institutional controls relied on in the remedy . . . .21
To be sure, this provision imposes a modest public disclosure requirement regarding the fact that a state voluntary cleanup has been pursued at a site. The provision also
accepts, however, that the state program may employ cleanup
standards, determined by reasonableness concerns, that will
leave sites not "suitable for unrestricted use," rather than the
stricter health protective standards mandated by the federal

program. 282
The amended statute also includes a second limitation
on the protection from CERCLA liability for sites cleaned
up under a state voluntary cleanup program. 2 83 The statute
identifies four exceptional circumstances under which EPA,
notwithstanding the general prohibition on imposing CERCLA liability at state voluntary cleanup sites, may pursue a
judicial or administrative enforcement action under CERCLA. 28 4 The most important of these exceptions is when EPA
determines that an imminent and substantial endangerment
is present at the site, despite the pursuit of a cleanup under
the state program. 28 5
In sum, the two-tier program established by the amended
CERCLA permits cleanup of less risky sites in accordance
with reasonable standards for safety that will promote economic redevelopment and growth. These sites may effectively
opt out of the enhanced protection mandated by CERCLA,
by pursuing the less protective and less expensive state cleanup programs. Sites where releases of hazardous substances
have been found to pose significant risks to public health and
the environment do not have this opt out option and will
continue to be subject to the federal statute's very stringent
health-based cleanup standards. The two-tier program was
very much a result of pressure to reshape a statute so that
it is more responsive to promoting economic growth at the
price of allowing greater residual risks to the affected public
following cleanup.

281. Id. The modesty of the public disclosure requirements that are sufficient to
qualify the state program for the benefits of protection from CERCLA liability
following cleanup under the state program may be seen by contrasting those
requirements with the public participation requirements that a state "includes
... or is taking reasonable steps to include" in its cleanup program in order to
qualify for a federal grant to support the development of a voluntary cleanup
program. Id. § 9628(a)(1)(A)(i). Such federal support is provided in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9628(a). Section 9628(a)(2) identifies the characteristics of eligible response
programs. One such characteristic is "[m]echanisms and resources to provide
meaningful opportunities for public participation," that include "prior notice
and opportunity for comment on proposed cleanup plans and site activities."
Id. § 9628(a)(2)(C)(ii).
282. Id. § 9628(a)(2)(C).
283. Id. § 9628(a)(2)(C).
284. See id. § 9628(b)(1)(B).
285. See id. § 9628(b)(1)(B)(iii).
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5.

The Use of a Reasonably Safe Standard
Enforced by the Government and
Supplemented by an Individual Opportunity to
Obtain Enhanced Protection

If the regime for the cleanup of contaminated sites provides a
way to opt out of enhanced protection, the SDWA28 6 can be
understood as providing an opportunity to opt in to enhanced
protection. This statute is intended to regulate the quality of
public drinking water. The current statute is a result of an
initial enactment in 1974,287 with significant amendments in
1986288 and 1996.289 The statute requires EPA to define two
standards for each water contaminant. 2 90
One standard, defined as the maximum contaminant
level goal ("MCLG"), is "the level at which no known or
anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur
and which allows an adequate margin of safety."2 91 The
MCLG is accordingly determined in the same manner as the
NAAQS are determined under the CAA-by a substance's
impact on human health. As discussed above, this healthbased standard reflects a strong preference for the health and
environment protection side of the sustainable development

balance. 2 92
The maximum contaminant level goal does not, however, prescribe a legally binding limit on the amount of a
contaminant permitted in drinking water. Instead, the statute imposes a different enforceable standard: the maximum
contaminant level ("MCL"). 2 93 The statute provides generally
that the MCL must be set at a level "which is as close to
the maximum contaminant level goal as is feasible." 2 94 The
statute defines feasible in a somewhat circular manner, providing that "the term 'feasible' means feasible with the use of
the best technology, treatment techniques and other means
which the Administrator finds, after examination for efficacy under field conditions and not solely under laboratory
conditions, are available (or more simply, taking cost into
consideration)." 2 95 Thus, when the SDWA imposes enforce-
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able standards on sources of public drinking water, it moves
away from a sole concern with health protection and requires
EPA to weigh both health effects and the costs of limiting the
amount of the pollutants contained in drinking water. This
feasibility requirement for the enforceable MCL standard
was further contextualized by the 1996 amendments, which
defined circumstances under which an otherwise feasible
standard would be unduly stringent. 2 96 In short, the MCL
standards imposed by the statute, the violation of which gives
rise to the imposition of sanctions, reflect a balance of the
two critical sustainable development variables: protection of
health and the environment against the impact on development, here focused on the costs of controls.
If the SDWA only required EPA to define MCLGs and
MCLs, the latter of which is enforceable, the statute would
appear to have the same basic structure as the CWA, which,
as we have seen, leans toward the protection of economic
growth in defining the extent to which health and the environment are protected. 2 97 The SDWA, however, following
the 1996 amendments, includes additional reporting requirements for companies providing public water supplies. The
Act now requires "each community water system to mail to
each customer of the system at least once annually a report
on the level of contaminants in the drinking water purveyed
by that system . . . ."298 Among the required contents for these
"consumer confidence reports" is the following information:
If any regulated contaminant is detected in the water purveyed by the public water system, a statement setting forth
(I) the maximum contaminant level goal, (II) the maximum
contaminant level, (III) the level of such contaminant in
such water system, and (IV) for any regulated contaminant

for which there has been a violation of the maximum contaminant level during the year concerned, the brief statement in plain language regarding the health concerns that
resulted in regulation of such contaminant . . . 299
The required annual reports accordingly must provide
consumers with information about both the levels of con-

286. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f -300j-26 (2006).
287. Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974). A central
objective of the 1974 statute was to expand EPA's authority to regulate the full
range of pollutants that affect the quality of drinking water. Prior to the statute's enactment, EPA had authority to regulate only "contaminants which may
cause or carry a communicable disease." H. REP. No. 93-1185, at 1 (1974),
reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6456, 6456.
288. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat.

642 (1986).
289. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110
Stat. 1613 (1996).
290. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4). The statute defines a "contaminant" as "any physical, chemical, biological, or radiological substance or matter in water." 42
U.S.C. § 300f(6).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A). The requirement that EPA define the MCLG for
a water contaminant was included in the 1986 amendments. See S. REP. No.

99-56, at 3-4, as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1568-69.
292. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
293. Both the MCLG and the MCL are required to be defined "simultaneously."
42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(a)(3). This requirement does not apply if a recommended
00
maximum contaminant level was published prior to June 19, 1986. Id. § 3 g1(a)(4).
294. Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B).
295. Id. § 300g-1(4)(D). This section also provides a specific finding about the feasibility of granulated activated carbon:

For the purpose of this paragraph, granular activated carbon is feasible
for the control of synthetic organic chemicals, and any technology,
treatment technique, or other means found to be the best available
for the control of synthetic organic chemicals must be at least as effective in controlling synthetic organic chemicals as granular activated
carbon.

Id.
296. See id § 300g-1(b)(6). The House Report explained that the amendment enacting this provision was intended to
authorize[ EPA to promulgate a [MCL] that is less stringent than
the level that would be established under paragraph 1412(b)(4), if the
Administrator determines that the benefits of a standard would not
justify its compliance costs. If the Administrator uses this authority,
he or she must set the standard at the level that maximizes health risk
reduction benefits at a cost that is justified by the benefits.
H.R. REP. No. 104-632, at 28 (1996), reprintedin1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1366,
1391. The 1996 amendments also permitted EPA to set the MCL at a level
different than the feasible level based on increases in risks to health that would
result from unintended effects of treatment techniques on other contaminants.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(6). The intent of this provision is discussed in
House Report 104-632.

297. See supra Part III.A.2.
298. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(4) (A).
299. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(4)(B)(iii).
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taminants in drinking water even when those levels are
permitted by the enforceable federal standards and EPA's
MCLGs.31o Moreover, the consumer confidence report is
required to contain
a brief and plainly worded definition of the terms "maximum contaminant level goal", "maximum contaminant
level", "variances", and "exemptions" and brief statements in
plain language regarding the health concerns that resulted in
regulation of each regulated contaminant. The regulations
shall also include a brief and plainly worded explanation
regarding contaminants that may reasonably be expected to
be present in drinking water, including bottled water. The
regulations shall also provide for an Environmental Protection Agency toll-free hotline that consumers can call for
more information and explanation.30 '
Based on their review of these annual reports, consumers
may decide that they do not wish to subject themselves to the
residual risks that result from the application of the enforceable, feasible limits on levels of contaminants in drinking
water. Such consumers may decide to purchase water from
other sources that meet the MCLGs defined by EPA, which
are based only on the consideration of what is needed to protect human health. Moreover, the requirements to provide
these reports to consumers may prompt companies to reduce
levels of contaminants, regardless of the fact that contaminant levels may comply with the feasible MCLs defined by
EPA.302

In sum, the SDWA supplements feasibility-based enforceable standards with information disclosure requirements that
permit consumers to avoid the reasonable residual risks that
result from an enforceable regulatory regime that is not solely
focused on protecting human health.

IV. The Lessons that Sustainable
Development Teaches About U.S.
Environmental Law
What lessons, then, does this review of the sustainable
development characteristics of the environmental law of the
United States present? Taken as a whole, U.S. environmental law appears to be quite inconsistent in its approach to
sustainable development. There is no single approach, even
within several individual statutes, much less across all statutes. Indeed, the broad and inconsistent set of approaches
may cause great uncertainty regarding whether there are
circumstances under which the regulatory regime ought to
favor protection of health and the environment over economic development, or provide for a balancing of the two.
Although the wide range of regulatory responses in U.S.
environmental law makes broad conclusions difficult, an
overall assessment of whether U.S. environmental law conforms to the international principle of sustainable development must begin with how that principle applies to a rich,
30f0. Id
301. Id. § 300g-3(c)(4)(A).
302. See CELIA CAMPBELL-MOHN, supra note 37, at 138-139.
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industrialized nation. In this setting, sustainable development requires that the environment be protected sufficiently,
if such protection is available at a reasonable cost.30 3
The summary of U.S. environmental law demonstrates
that one statute, the CWA, fails to meet this standard. The
environmental protection provided by this statute is sufficient only if we accept that, aside from the nation's highest
quality waters,3 0 4 waters will have only a quality that (1) is
better than waste transport and assimilation30 5 and (2) allows
only the uses that emerge from the statute's significant limits on discharges of pollutants from industrial point sources
and no enforceable limits on nonpoint source discharges.3 0 6
Although this degree of control is affordable in the aggregate
and therefore consistent with promoting economic development, the statute's regulatory regime is certainly not sufficient to meet the CWA's goals of fishable and swimmable
waters. 30 7
The insufficiency of the CWA's requirements may be contrasted with the CAA regulation of emissions of hazardous
air pollutants. The CAA, like the CWA, imposes controls
on the basis of available technology. 308 The CAA, however,
provides for a second phase of regulation, which is intended
to ensure that the residual risks that are present after the
imposition of available technology do not impose more than
a minimal risk to human health. 30 9
The SDWA also presents important contrasts with the
CWA. The SDWA defines its initial level of control by balancing the costs and benefits of control, 310 rather than focusing solely on available technology, as the CWA does. The
SDWA also includes requirements that may result in greater
protection of health and the environment. 311 The CWA's
regime of enhanced control through the enforcement of
water quality standards offers little added protection because
those standards are determined by current uses of the waters,
which are dependent on the protection provided by available
technology.312
This critique of the CWA is not the only understanding that is gained from the consideration of the sustainable
development principle in U.S. environmental law. In presenting the federal statutes' wide range of regulatory responses,
the overview provides insights into how different regulatory
methods may be employed to promote sustainable development. One way in which the type of response may differ is
in the regulatory approach that is pursued after accounting
for the impact on the environment, the impact on development, or a balancing of the two. For example, the CAAs
second phase health-based limits on hazardous air pollutant
emissions requires that any residual risk to human health,
following the application of available control technology, is
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

See supra Part II.
See supranotes 106-08 and accompanying text.
See supranote 101 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 103-05 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supranotes 201-04 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 211-12 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 293-96 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 298-302 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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minimized.31 3 The SDWA, on the other hand, relies on the
health-based MCLGs as the basis for a reporting requirement
about the risks that remain following the application of command-and-control treatment standards that are determined
by a balancing of the costs and benefits of regulation.314 In
short, the law may provide protection beyond a baseline of
control in different ways that have widely different costs.
In its layering of regulatory requirements, TSCA's structure ties the regulatory requirements to the type of risk to
health or the environment that is posed. This regime modifies the stringency of regulatory controls with the level of
identified risk. When a thumb is placed on the environmental protection side of the balance, the regulatory approach is
least intrusive and least expensive.31 5 When costly regulatory
controls are at issue through the imposition of commandand-control requirements, a balancing of costs and benefits
is required.3 1 6 In short, sustainable development values may
be accounted for in the type of regulatory response that is
employed, in addition to the location along the sustainable
development spectrum that determines whether a regulatory
response may or must be taken. Favoring environmental protection is more likely to be politically acceptable if the resulting regulatory requirements are less expensive.317
One factor that appears to be of great significance in
affecting judgments of sustainable-development characteristics in the regulatory approach is the voluntariness of exposure to the risks resulting from environmental degradation.
The existence of voluntariness relates to whether there are
alternatives to risk exposure. Whether there are alternatives
to risk exposure will often depend on whether different uses
are available for the environmental amenity and the public's
view of the relative importance of those uses (for example,
critical habitat for an endangered species).
Where only a single, unavoidable, involuntary use is available, it is most defensible to impose health or environmental
quality based standards that will allow the use to be pursued
without resultant harm (or unreasonable risk) to the user.
This is the CAAs approach to the regulation of criteria pollutants given the broad, uniform, and involuntary exposure
of all when breathing the ambient air.318
Reduced environmental protection is more understandable when multiple uses are acceptable, such as for surface
waters and land for development. Where multiple uses are
possible and allow the avoidance of risks by limiting exposure, permitting local government to identify applicable uses
313. See supra Part III.C.2.
314. See supra Part III.C.5.
315. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
317. Another way in which the response often differs is in the legal effect that the
relevant considerations have on the regulator. For example, different statutes
require that the agency balance the costs and benefits of regulation before making any regulatory response. These statutes often differ, however, in how they
define the legal effect of that balancing. Some statutes permit regulatory action;
other statutes require regulatory actions; and others preclude action based on
the agency's balancing of costs and benefits. Given the difficulty and uncertainty of any of the three determinations, however, the implementing agency
is likely to have substantial discretion about a regulatory response, even when
a response is required, rather than permitted.
318. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
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in compliance with federally mandated minimum requirements may be a sensible approach. This provides a partial
explanation for the limited protection of the environment
in the CWA.31 9 This approach is effective, however, only if
the affected public is actually aware of the opportunity to
avoid risks. Such awareness will depend on the provision of
understandable information to those who may be exposed
to residual risks. The SDWA seeks to communicate this
information about risks by informing users of public water
sources about all water contamination, even when the level
is below the level permitted by federal law.3 20 The amended
CERCLA, which permits cleanups pursuant to the reasonable standards defined by state cleanup programs rather than
the fully health-protective federal standards, takes an analogous approach, but it does not provide sufficient information
to the affected public about residual risks.3 21
Another factor that plays a critical role in determining a
federal law's approach toward sustainable development is the
extent of the risk present before regulation.3 22 The result is
that federal law provides varying degrees of protection that
sanction a spectrum of residual risks based on the extent of
risk posed prior to regulation.3 23 This can be seen within and
across various regulatory regimes.3 2 4 For example, the CWA
imposes more stringent controls on discharges of toxic pollutants than on discharges of conventional pollutants.3 25
Another example is the very stringent regulatory requirements mandated by RCRA,3 26 which are triggered only when
solid waste is hazardous.3 2 7
This approach may have some intuitive appeal. It is
understandable that Congress would want to impose the
most stringent requirements on pollutants or activities that
pose the greatest risk to the environment and health. The
approach is ultimately not convincing, however, because the
risk following regulation remains and there is no reason to
accept greater post-regulation risks to health and the environment simply because there was a reduced starting risk.
The focus should instead be either on whether the final risk
is acceptable, or on the balance of the costs and benefits of

regulation.3 28
319.
320.
321.
322.

See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 272-82 and accompanying text (describing more stringent federal, as contrasted with state, cleanup standards, with eligibility for
latter available for less hazardous sites).
323. See, e.g., supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing varying stringencies of controls placed on discharges of pollutants under the Clean Water
Act, based on the extent of risk posed prior to regulation).
324. See, e.g., infra notes 325-26 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 228-43 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
328. Notwithstanding this understanding of the significance of final risks, there is
reason to support greater regulation of more serious risks in other respects.
When initial risks are greatest, fail-safe measures, such as RCRA's technologybased standards supplementing a health-based regime of protection, are more
likely to be accepted as appropriate. This approach is analogous to the ESA
process for exemptions added by the 1976 amendments: The statute's bar on
activities with catastrophically adverse impacts on endangered species may be
avoided only when a committee supermajority permits the exemption based
on a showing that the benefits of the proposed action "clearly outweigh" the
expected harm to the environment. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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A final, and counter-intuitive insight, applies to the regulatory regimes that reflect development concerns by providing environmental protection only to the degree provided
by available technologies.3 29 These regimes place a thumb
on the scale to protect development only in the aggregate
and thereby do not consider the impact of control costs on
individual polluters.330 The cost of pollution controls available to a category of polluters may cause individual sources
of pollution to go out of business. One way to moderate this
effect is to supplement technology-based requirements with a
properly structured system for trading the right to pollute.331
Moreover, the available technology approach to regulation
does not closely consider the cost of the protection accomplished by the available technologies.33 2 The result is that the
available technologies approach may yield pollution control
that is very costly for the health or environmental benefit that
is gained.333 Thus, by looking only at the overall impact of
the regulation on development, this regulatory regime may
ironically protect the environment too much, if the ideal is
to protect the environment only to the degree justified by the
nature and extent of adverse impacts.

V.

41

Conclusion

Sustainable development is a principle of international environmental law that seeks a proper balance between protection
of the environment and economic development. This article
has evaluated the principal federal environmental statutes by
reference to sustainable development. That evaluation provides an important critique of the CWA. The evaluation also
provides a framework for considering how greater protection
of the environment may be achieved through methods that
are less likely to impede economic development.

329. Examples of this approach are CWA regulation, see supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text, and the first phase of regulation of hazardous air pollutants
under the CAA, see supra notes 202-05.
330. See supranotes 78-81 and accompanying text.
331. See supranote 80.
332. See supranotes 77-79 & 205-09 and accompanying text.
333. See supranote 210 and accompanying text.
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